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REGULATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Thomas V. Burch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory arbitration is a recent phenomenon, and it poses a seemingly
intractable problem. After the Supreme Court’s Southland Corp. v. Keating
decision in 1984,1 companies increasingly began adding arbitration provisions to
their consumer, employee, and franchisee agreements—often using those
provisions to restrict or eliminate the nondrafting parties’ rights. While these
provisions usually lacked bilateral consent, the Court instructed lower courts to
allow their use, claiming that parties should have autonomy to negotiate the
manner in which they resolve disputes.2 At the same time, the Court steadily
expanded the Federal Arbitration Act’s scope, thereby increasing the number of
mandatory arbitration agreements governed by the Act.3 The Court took these steps
despite the evidence of mandatory arbitration’s negative effects on nondrafting
parties’ rights.4
Starting in the mid-1990s, however, consumers, employees, and franchisees
began fighting the Court’s pro-arbitration mandate. In particular, they began asking
lower courts to strike arbitration provisions under the unconscionability doctrine,
and they began asking Congress to pass laws prohibiting mandatory arbitration for
certain categories of disputes.5 While they achieved some early successes, the
results of their efforts, overall, have been mixed.6 For example, when a number of
lower courts began using the unconscionability doctrine to strike egregious
arbitration provisions, the Supreme Court began limiting the doctrine’s use by
shifting decision-making authority to arbitrators.7 And when Congress finally
passed bills prohibiting mandatory arbitration, the bills applied to very narrow
*
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1
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
2
See id. at 7–8.
3
See discussion infra Part II.C.
4
See infra notes 234–236, 251 and accompanying text.
5
See discussion infra Part III.B.
6
See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
7
See, e.g., Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (limiting
parties’ abilities to challenge arbitration clauses in court by finding that if parties assign the
arbitrability question to the arbitrator through a delegation clause, arbitrators have the
exclusive right to determine whether the agreement is unconscionable).
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categories of disputes, providing little relief for the parties most frequently
subjected to the mandatory-arbitration process.8
Because of these mixed results, the mandatory arbitration debate has
intensified over the last several years. Companies and courts are increasingly
fighting to preserve it, claiming that mandatory arbitration lowers disputeresolution costs and reduces judicial caseloads.9 Consumers, employees, and
franchisees, on the other hand, are increasingly fighting to eliminate it, claiming
that it is an unfair process that restricts or eliminates fundamental individual
rights.10 Both sides have compelling arguments, but neither side seems willing to
acknowledge the merit of the other side’s argument and to compromise11—even
though compromise seems to be the only workable approach.
This Article proposes such a compromise: allow companies to mandate
arbitration, but regulate the process to increase its fairness for the parties subjected
to it. This will allow us to study mandatory arbitration over time while examining
regulatory effects on its overall fairness, which is a goal-oriented, pragmatic
approach to dealing with the mandatory arbitration problem. Accordingly, Part II
begins by highlighting the Federal Arbitration Act’s history, both before and after
Congress passed it in 1925.12 This history demonstrates how the Supreme Court
has used formalistic reasoning to expand the Act beyond Congress’s original intent
and indicates that the Act’s historical genesis justifies (at least partially) the end
this Article seeks to achieve: improving mandatory arbitration’s fairness through
regulation.13 In particular, the Act’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress
wanted to protect individual rights against abuse from parties with greater
8

See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong.
§ 8116 (2009) (prohibiting the government from contracting with employers that require
arbitration of “any claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related
to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment”); John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, 109th Cong. § 670 (2006) (exempting
military personnel and their dependents from having to arbitrate consumer-credit disputes).
9
See infra notes 23, 132, 216 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 241–243 and accompanying text.
11
Compare TAYLOR LINCOLN & DAVID ARKUSH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION
DEBATE TRAP: HOW OPPONENTS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT THE DEBATE
ON ARBITRATION (2008), and JOHN O’DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP:
HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), with PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION – A GOOD DEAL
FOR CONSUMERS: A RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CITIZEN (2008).
12
When Congress passed the Act in 1925, it was known as the United States
Arbitration Act. It became the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947 when Congress reenacted
and codified it as Title 9 of the U.S. Code. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). For simplicity’s sake, I refer to it throughout as the Federal
Arbitration Act.
13
See Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard
Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 703–04 (2003) (“Guiding ideals such as
‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘freedom’ must be critically examined by looking to past
experience.”).
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bargaining power,14 which, at the very least, is worth considering when deciding
how to proceed in the mandatory arbitration debate.
Part III explains the consumers’, employees’, and franchisees’ response to the
Supreme Court’s expansion of the Act.15 Specifically, it addresses these groups’
use of the unconscionability doctrine, the Court’s recent limitation of that defense,
and how that limitation leaves Congress as these groups’ last hope against
mandatory arbitration. Part III also summarizes an original survey of the 139 antiarbitration bills introduced in Congress since 1995—the majority of which have
proposed eliminating mandatory arbitration. Overall, this survey shows that the
consumers, employees, and franchisees pushing these bills have taken a
shortsighted approach that disregards mandatory arbitration’s public benefits and
makes arbitration itself seem like the problem.
Finally, Part IV critiques both the Supreme Court’s and the reform groups’
approaches to mandatory arbitration, finding that both are, among other things, too
rigid. Part IV then offers a pragmatic, regulatory approach—one that rejects the
Supreme Court’s idea that the Act is grounded in permanent, immutable principles
as well as the reform groups’ position that eliminating mandatory arbitration is
justified by a moral consensus regarding the enforcement of rights. This new
approach attempts to balance companies’ needs against individuals’ rights, which
is the best way to resolve the current discord surrounding the mandatoryarbitration debate.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ARBITRATION FORMALISM
Common law develops largely through judgments in litigated cases—even for
laws founded in legislation.16 The result, too often, is bureaucratic formalism in
14

See, e.g., Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements
for Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce
Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14–15 (1924)
[hereinafter 1924 Joint Hearings] (statements of Sen. Thomas Sterling, Chairman,
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary and Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New
York State Chamber of Commerce); A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in
Interstate Commerce; and a Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or
Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions,
or Commerce Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations: Hearing on S. 4213
and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–10
(1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings] (statements of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh and W.H.H. Piatt,
Chairman, Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar
Association).
15
For the sake of simplicity, I will sometimes refer to these consumers, employees,
and franchisees (and the advocacy groups working on their behalves) as the “reform
groups” or the “reform advocates.” Specific examples of the advocacy groups include the
National Association of Consumer Advocates, Public Citizen, Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, and the National Consumer Law Center, to name a few.
16
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, at vii (1992).
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judicial decisions.17 Courts choose a position and stick with it regardless of facts,
circumstances, or events that might otherwise lead to a different outcome. And
their written decisions “run in deductive form with an air or expression of singleline inevitability.”18
Such has been the case with the Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration
Act. Starting in the 1980s, the Court adopted a “national policy favoring
arbitration,”19 and it has since used that policy, coupled with the idea of party
autonomy, to expand the Act’s scope beyond Congress’s original intent. Now the
Act is applicable in both state and federal courts, it encompasses statutory and
employment claims, and it applies to disputes between parties with unequal
bargaining power—even if one party hasn’t truly consented to arbitrate.20 Congress
intended none of these.21 In other words, the Court’s formalism has crafted a
Federal Arbitration Act that bears little resemblance to the Act that Congress
originally passed.22
The Court stretched the Act so far by routinely distorting its legislative
history. The following sections address the Act’s development before 1925,
Congress’s intentions in passing it that year, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent,
consistent refusal to heed Congress’s intent when interpreting it. Together, these
sections illustrate the lengths to which the Court has gone to expand the Act and,
correspondingly, aid in reducing judicial caseloads.23

17

See id.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960)
(describing formalism’s ideology as follows: “the rules of law are to decide the cases;
policy is for the legislature, not for the courts, and so is change even in pure common
law”). “Single-line inevitability” refers to failure of courts to provide reasoning for their
decisions.
19
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”).
20
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99–100
(2006) (stating that the Act “has been construed to preempt state law, eliminate the
requirement of consent to arbitration, permit arbitration of statutory rights, and remove the
jury trial right from citizens without their knowledge or consent”).
21
See infra notes 52–72 and accompanying text.
22
Moses, supra note 20, at 99–100 (stating that the Act as interpreted today by the
Supreme Court probably would not have commanded any votes in the 1925 Congress).
23
See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172 (“One cannot immerse oneself in the
arbitration cases without coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the Court is
docket-clearing pure and simple.”); see also Moses, supra note 20, at 156 (“These judicial
policy choices appear to reflect the interest of the courts in reducing the judicial
caseload.”).
18
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A. The Federal Arbitration Act’s Development
Arbitration was not integral to early social or economic development in the
United States.24 In fact, although the first arbitration tribunal convened in 1786 in
New York,25 another 134 years passed before the practice gained widespread
acceptance. That began when New York passed the first modern arbitration statute
in 1920.26
New York, not surprisingly, figured prominently in arbitration’s
development.27 It was the country’s largest commercial center and its courts were
backlogged with business disputes.28 Those businesses wanted a more efficient,
less-expensive method for resolving their differences—one that would help
preserve business relationships by avoiding protracted, expensive delays in
courts.29 Arbitration met those needs, but the original system wasn’t perfect.
Specifically, neither the common law nor any of the states’ early arbitration
statutes would enforce predispute arbitration agreements.30 Either party to a dispute
could opt out of arbitration and compel the other to litigate the claim.31
24

FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 6 (1948) (“It did not become an integral part of the early social and
economic development of the country nor a recognized institution of any consequence and
its impact was negligible upon the growth of justice in the country.”).
25
Id. at 4.
26
Id. at 9–11 (calling the New York statute a “revolutionary step”); CAMERON K.
WEHRINGER, ARBITRATION PRECEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 5 (1969).
27
See generally KELLOR, supra note 24 at 3–21; see also MACNEIL, supra note 16, at
15, 25 (stating that arbitration was “neither a new nor an uncommon practice in the United
States” at the turn of the twentieth century and that “New York had long been a center of
arbitration activity”).
28
In 1923, for example, the New York Supreme Court was three years behind on its
docket. See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose,
Representative, Arbitration Society of America).
29
Moses, supra note 20, at 103 (“Businessmen needed solutions that were simpler,
faster, and cheaper.”). In fact, it appears that arbitration advocates at the time did not see
arbitration as a form of litigation. See JULIUS H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
THE LAW 10–23 (1918) (explaining arbitration as a way to avoid “unnecessary litigation”).
30
Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REV. 265, 265 (1926) (“By this Act there is reversed the hoary doctrine that agreements for
arbitration are revocable at will and are unenforceable, and in the language of the statute
itself, they are made ‘valid, enforceable and irrevocable’ within the limits of Federal
jurisdiction.”). There were some exceptions to this general rule, but the problems the rule
created were big enough to lead to the reform movement, which led to Congress passing
the FAA, which made all pre-dispute arbitration agreements presumptively valid. See also
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 20–21.
31
A party could opt out even after the arbitration had started. And while opting out
would be considered a breach of contract, for which damages were available, suits to
collect such damages were ineffective. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 20; see also WESLEY A.
STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 82 (1930) (“Statements . . .
frequently appear to the effect that a party who is aggrieved by the breach of such an
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Courts allowed this “opting out” for two reasons. First, they wanted to protect
parties with little bargaining power.32 Second, it was a holdover from English
common law when courts zealously protected their jurisdiction.33 The American
courts tended to follow suit, apparently feeling constrained by the English courts’
longstanding decisions.34 This resulted in decreased certainty over where disputes
would be resolved.35 If either party believed it had a technical advantage in
avoiding arbitration (e.g., the expected delay in court, the application of a
particular procedural rule, or the right to greater discovery), that party was free to
ignore the arbitration agreement and litigate the claim in court.36
These problems led to the arbitration reform movement that started shortly
after the turn of the twentieth century.37 Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer
shepherded the movement,38 and passing New York’s modern arbitration statute

agreement can maintain an action for damages. So few cases, however, have involved such
an action that if there is such a rule of law it rests upon this popular acclaim.”).
32
1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 15 (statement of Julius H. Cohen, General
Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce) (“[A]t the time this rule was made
people were not able to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men
would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them”).
33
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 283 (“The explanation is to be found in our
English system of jurisprudence. For many centuries there has been established a rule,
rooted originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction, that parties might not, by
their agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the courts.”).
34
Id. at 270; see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“The courts have felt that the
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although
they have frequently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice
which results from it.”). Apparently there were English courts questioning the soundness of
this rule, but American courts either glossed over or ignored those decisions. See COHEN,
supra note 29, at 226–241 (explaining how the English rule of revocability was adopted by
American courts).
35
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 270.
36
Id. (“The result is that this party is usually loath to surrender his supposed
advantage.”).
37
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 25, 28–30, 38 (describing the elimination of the rule of
revocability as the reformers’ “quest” and calling Cohen’s 1918 book the “kickoff” of the
campaign to educate the public on arbitration); COHEN, supra note 29, at 53–252
(dedicating the majority of the book to explaining why the doctrine of revocability was a
“judicial error”).
38
See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 28 (recognizing Bernheimer and Cohen as the
founders of the reform movement); Moses, supra note 20, at 101–11 (calling Cohen and
Bernheimer “instrumental” in passing New York’s modern statute and then detailing their
involvement in passing the Federal Arbitration Act). Although Cohen and Bernheimer
shepherded the movement, several others were influential in the movement as well. For
example, W.H.H. Piatt, chairman of an ABA committee on arbitration, lobbied for the
FAA. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 88. Also, the Arbitration Society of America was
instrumental in pushing for federal reform. KELLOR, supra note 24, at 13.
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was their first major success.39 They used this success to lobby Congress for a
federal law that would make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court.40
They wanted to ensure that New York parties, for example, could compel parties
from other states to arbitrate (assuming they had a valid agreement).41
Cohen wrote the first draft of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1921, basing it
largely on New York’s 1920 statute.42 He submitted it to the American Bar
Association (ABA) for approval, but it lacked certain procedural provisions (which
New York provided in its civil procedure code) so the ABA did not approve it.43
Cohen fixed the problem and submitted a second draft in 1922, which the ABA
approved. Senator Sterling and Congressman Mills then introduced it in each
house of Congress,44 but their bills went no further than the Senate and House
judiciary committees.45 So the ABA approved another draft in 1923 that
incorporated Congressional comments from the previous session.46 Sterling and
Mills introduced this draft to Congress in December 1923,47 subcommittees from
each house’s judiciary committee held a joint hearing in January 1924,48 and
Congress ultimately approved this draft (with minor changes) in February 1925.49
President Coolidge signed it shortly thereafter,50 and it became effective on
January 1, 1926.51

39

MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 28–31. New York’s new law led to the creation of the
Arbitration Society of America in 1922, which was the “first permanent independent
institution of arbitration.” KELLOR, supra note 24, at 11. It later merged (in 1926) with the
Arbitration Foundation to become the American Arbitration Association. Id. at 15–17. The
American Arbitration Association institutionalized arbitration “by giving it a central
administrative organization, facilities for research and education, a laboratory for
experiment, and a national system of tribunals.” Id. at 25.
40
See Moses, supra note 20, at 101–02.
41
Id.
42
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 85–86. One of the main differences was that the
proposed Federal Arbitration Act appeared to allow oral agreements to arbitrate future
disputes. Id. at 85. The fact that this provision was later stricken shows that the drafters and
legislators were concerned about parties’ consent to arbitrate.
43
Id. at 85–87.
44
Id. at 88.
45
Id. at 88–91. The House Judiciary Committee never held a hearing. Id. at 91. The
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing in January 1923. See 1923 Hearings, supra note
14, at 1.
46
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 91.
47
Id. at 92.
48
See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 1.
49
The House passed the Act on June 6, 1924. The Senate passed it on January 31,
1925. The House then considered and passed the Senate’s amendments on February 4,
1925. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 100–01. For a copy of the Act as passed by Congress in
1925, see STURGES, supra note 31, at 983.
50
Coolidge signed the Act on February 12, 1925. MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 101.
51
Moses, supra note 20, at 110.
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B. Congress’s Intentions in Passing the Federal Arbitration Act
When asked in 1923 to state the Federal Arbitration Act’s purpose,
Bernheimer said it would: (1) reduce consumer costs; (2) reduce court delays; (3)
save time and money for the disputants; (4) preserve business relationships; and (5)
simply enforce voluntary agreements to arbitrate disputes.52 Similar comments
between 1921 and 1926 on the Act’s purposes were common from legislators and
other reform advocates,53 and they provide great insight into what Congress
intended in passing the Act.54
First, the comments demonstrate that Congress passed the Act as a procedural
mechanism for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal, not state, courts.
Cohen, for example, submitted a brief at the 1924 joint hearings supporting this
idea: “The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional provision by
which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”55
Although there was little testimony on this topic during the hearing,56 the House
Committee Report confirmed Cohen’s position by stating:
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an
agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
52

MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 29–30 (citing Report of the Standing Committee on
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, 47 ANN. REP. ABA 279 app. b at 300 (1924)). I
want to emphasize the portion of Bernheimer’s comments on the voluntary nature of
arbitration. Specifically, he said: “It is voluntary. No one need agree to arbitrate unless it is
his wish.” Id. at 30.
53
See, e.g., Bernheimer himself reiterated the same basic comments at the Joint
Hearings in 1924. 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Charles L.
Bernheimer, Chairman, Comm. on Arbitration, New York State Chamber of Commerce)
(“It raises business standards. It maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation,
and eliminates the law’s delay by relieving our courts.”).
54
Part of the reason that comments from the reform advocates are so important in
interpreting the intent of the Act is that much of the debate over the Act took place between
those advocates before the ABA, not before Congress. Congress basically adopted the Act
as provided to it by the ABA. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 107–09.
55
1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 37 (brief submitted by Julius H. Cohen,
General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce). Senator Sterling accepted the
brief into the record without objection. Id. at 33. Cohen reiterated this intent in his 1926
article in the Virginia Law Review. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 275–76 (“[The
statute] rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish
and control inferior Federal courts. . . . The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the
Federal courts for the enforcement of certain arbitration agreements.”).
56
Senator Sterling and Representative Dyer had a brief exchange on “the authority of
Congress to legislate on this subject” with Sterling agreeing that Congress had “ample”
authority and jurisdiction. See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 24 (statements of
Sen. Thomas Sterling, Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, and Rep.
Leonidas C. Dyer, Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary).
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procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is
brought and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of
the forum in which the contract is made. Before such contracts could be
enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is essential.57
Further confirming this limit on the Act’s scope, Cohen, Bernheimer, and others
were pushing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) for an arbitration act that states could adopt to make predispute
arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts.58 If the reformers believed that
the Federal Arbitration Act would be applicable in state courts, their efforts before
the NCCUSL would have been unnecessary.59
Second, the legislators’ and reform advocates’ comments during this period
reveal that Congress intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply to arbitration
agreements between businesses with relatively equal bargaining power—not
agreements between businesses and their employees or consumers. For example,
take Bernheimer’s 1923 comments to the ABA where he said that the Act would
“preserve business friendships” and that it would apply only to “voluntary”
agreements.60 While these comments do not explicitly limit the Act to arbitration
57

H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924). While the report says that the Act “is founded
also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty,” this
justification was secondary, at best. Id.; see also Moses, supra note 20, at 110 (“By use of
the word ‘also,’ the reference to the commerce and admiralty power appears to be a fallback position, a secondary basis of power.”). Cohen seemed to think that Congress’s power
over federal courts was the main, if not the sole, authority for passing the Act. See Cohen &
Dayton, supra note 30, at 275 (“It has been suggested that the proposed law depends
entirely for its validity upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers
of Congress. This is not the fact. . . . It rests upon the constitutional provision by which
Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”); 1924 Joint
Hearings, supra note 14, at 37 (brief submitted by Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New
York State Chamber of Commerce).
58
See Moses, supra note 20, at 102. The NCCUSL passed the Uniform Arbitration
Act in 1925. See STURGES, supra note 31, at 957.
59
Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 649–50 (1996) (“The fact that
the same groups that sought passage of the FAA were working simultaneously on state
laws that would have been superfluous if the FAA were truly intended to govern the state
forum as well as the federal bolsters this conclusion.”). The idea that the Act was intended
to apply in federal courts is further supported by its repeated references to “federal courts.”
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 106–07 (“Either the ABA and Congress were being
extraordinarily dense in failing to recognize that those references should be to all courts, or
they meant exactly what they said when they referred only to federal courts.”).
60
See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 30 (citing Report of the Standing Committee on
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, 47 ANN. REP. ABA 279 app. b at 300 (1924));
see also 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer,
Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, New York State Chamber of Commerce) (“It
preserves business relationships.”).
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agreements covering business-to-business disputes,61 they strongly imply as much
because they responded to existing and anticipated questions over whether the Act
would apply to adhesive contracts.62 Also, at the 1923 Hearing before the Senate
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Walsh expressed
concerns over take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements,63 and Senator Sterling
expressed similar concerns at the 1924 Joint Hearings.64 On both occasions, the
persons being questioned assured the senators that the reformers did not intend to
apply the Act to adhesive agreements.65 Their statements, along with similar
statements made by other reform advocates,66 show that the reformers drafted, and

61

One could argue, for example, that a relationship between a business and a
customer is a “business friendship” and that customers “voluntarily” sign binding
arbitration agreements despite any disparity in bargaining power or lack of choice. I would
disagree with such an argument, of course, but I recognize that it could be made.
62
This issue was raised perhaps most fervently in arguments before the NCCUSL and
the ABA over whether the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act that would apply in state
courts should cover pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at
49–54 (quoting statements made by Joseph Francis O’Connell, who, in summarizing the
feelings of the NCCUSL’s arbitration committee, expressed concern over individuals
“giving up rights that the American people really regard as sacred” by signing adhesive
agreements to arbitrate disputes). Because of this concern, the NCCUSL excluded predispute agreements from UAA coverage and the ABA subsequently approved this nonmodern version of that Act. Id. at 54.
63
1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9 (statement of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh). Prior to
Senator Walsh’s comments, W.H.H. Piatt raised the issue on his own with regard to
employment agreements. To alleviate any concerns that the Act would allow employers to
force employees into arbitration, Mr. Piatt said: “It is not intended that this shall be an act
referring to labor disputes, at all.” Id. (statements of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, Committee of
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association).
64
1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 15 (statement of Sen. Thomas Sterling,
Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary).
65
Id. (statement of Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of
Commerce) (attempting to assure Senator Sterling that the Act was not intended to apply to
adhesive contracts); 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt,
Chairman, Committee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar
Association) (“Speaking for myself, personally, I would say I would not favor any kind of
legislation that would permit the forcing a man to sign that kind of a contract.”).
66
See, e.g., 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose,
Representative, Arbitration Society of America) (“It is only the idea that arbitration may
now have the aid of the court to enforce these provisions which men voluntarily enter
into.”); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 279 (“No one is required to make an agreement
to arbitrate. Such action by a party is entirely voluntary.”). In the early years of the Federal
Arbitration Act, arbitration under the Act remained a voluntary process. See KELLOR, supra
note 24, at 168 (“The voluntary nature of arbitration as an American policy has been
steadily maintained.”).
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that Congress intended to pass, an Act that applied to arbitration agreements
between merchants with relatively equal bargaining power.67
Finally, the reform advocates’ comments demonstrate that they did not intend
for the Act to apply to statutory or employment disputes. Cohen, for example,
stated that arbitration “is not the proper method for deciding points of law of major
importance involving . . . the application of statutes.”68 According to Cohen, those
questions were better reserved for “skilled judges” and “established systems of
law.”69 And W. H. H. Piatt stated that the Act was not intended to apply to
employment disputes “at all.”70 In fact, the reformers envisioned the Act applying
only to “trade disputes” between merchants involving factual questions and
“simpler questions of law.”71 This meshed with their view of the Act’s limited
scope and with how courts applied the Act in the early years after Congress passed
it.72 But this view would not survive very long. The Supreme Court soon began
expanding the Act far beyond its original scope—ignoring Congressional intent,
and the reform advocates’ intent, along the way.
C. The Court’s Steady Expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act’s Scope
Although the Federal Arbitration Act started as a procedural statute applicable
in federal courts to agreements between merchants, the Supreme Court eventually
transformed it into a substantive law statute that applied in both federal and state
courts and to agreements between merchants and individuals. The process started
in 1938 with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, a case that on its surface had nothing
to do with arbitration.73 And it has continued over the last seventy-plus years

67

See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 281 (“[Arbitration] is a remedy peculiarly
suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of
fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, excuses for
non-performance, and the like.”); Moses, supra note 20, at 108 (“The new law was not
intended to permit a party with greater economic strength to compel a weaker party to
arbitrate.”); Sternlight, supra note 59, at 641 (“When Congress passed the FAA in 1925, it
intended only to require federal courts to accept arbitration agreements that had been
voluntarily entered into by two parties of relatively equal bargaining power in arms’ length
transactions.”).
68
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 281.
69
Id. Although Cohen did not make this argument before Congress, it is consistent
with his position before Congress that the Act was limited in scope, applying mainly to
factual disputes between merchants. See Moses, supra note 20, at 111.
70
1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9 (statements of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman,
Committee of Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association).
71
See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer,
Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, New York State Chamber of Commerce); Cohen &
Dayton, supra note 30, at 281.
72
See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 122–33.
73
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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through a series of Supreme Court decisions that, collectively, show how the Court
has legislated a new Act—one that Congress did not envision.74
In Erie the Court overturned Swift v. Tyson75 and held that federal courts must
apply state substantive law in diversity cases.76 Because the Act was intended to be
procedural, at first Erie had no effect on it.77 But that began to change in 1945 with
the Court’s decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.78 There, the Court found that in
determining whether to apply state or federal law in diversity cases, courts should
focus less on whether a law is substantive or procedural and more on whether
applying federal law would lead to a different outcome.79 Under this “outcome
determinative” test, state law applied if the federal law would lead to a different
result.80 This raised the question of whether compelling arbitration under the Act
could be outcome determinative.
The Court first faced this question in 1956 in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America,81 a case involving the breach of an employment contract made in New
York and carried out in Vermont.82 The contract required the parties to arbitrate
their disputes before the American Arbitration Association in New York, but
Bernhardt sued in a Vermont state court.83 At the time, Vermont did not enforce
predispute arbitration agreements,84 so Polygraphic removed the case to federal
court in Vermont, asking it to stay the litigation and compel arbitration. The
district court denied the stay; the court of appeals reversed; and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari because of the court of appeals’ “doubtful application” of Erie.85
Bernhardt held that the Act did not apply in diversity cases involving
intrastate commerce.86 And because the Court found that this case did, in fact,
involve intrastate commerce, it could have stopped its opinion there.87 But it
74

See Moses, supra note 20, at 114–54; see also MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 144
(describing Justice Stevens’ opinion in Southland as “an unusually frank recognition of the
ongoing legislative role of the Court in amending legislation over time”).
75
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
76
Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 77–78.
77
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 134 (“The [FAA] was a statute aimed at governing the
procedure in federal courts, not the substantive law those courts applied. The act did not
therefore depend upon the continuing validity of Swift.”).
78
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
79
Id. at 110.
80
Id. at 109–11.
81
350 U.S. 198 (1956).
82
Id. at 199.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 199–200.
85
Id. at 200.
86
Id. at 202 (“We conclude that the stay provided in § 3 reaches only those contracts
covered by §§ 1 and 2.”).
87
Id. at 200–01 (“There is no showing that petitioner while performing his duties
under the employment contract was working ‘in’ commerce, was producing goods for
commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our
decisions.”).
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continued, in dicta, to address whether compelling arbitration could be outcomedeterminative, ultimately finding that it could.88 Specifically, the Court said “If the
federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought. For
the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially
affects the cause of action created by the State.”89 Put differently, the Act was
more than just a procedural statute to be applied in federal court; it was a
substantive measure that could affect a dispute’s outcome.90 Reaching this
conclusion increased the chances that the Court might, in a future case, find that
the Act was “substantive in the full-blown regulatory sense that would lead to
invocation of the Supremacy Clause.”91 And that was what began to happen in
1967 with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.92
In Prima Paint, a diversity case involving interstate commerce, the Court had
to decide whether a court or an arbitrator should hear a fraudulent inducement
claim.93 This presented a dilemma under Guaranty Trust Co.’s outcomedeterminative test: if the Court accepted Bernhardt’s reasoning that arbitration
“substantially affects the cause of action created by the State,”94 then it would have
to find that the Act did not apply in diversity cases because it was “substantive”
under Erie. This would directly contradict Congress’s original reason for passing
the Act.95 So, without deciding whether applying state law would lead to a
different outcome,96 the Court simply applied the Act and allowed the arbitrator to
resolve the claim.97 To support its conclusion, the Court said: “[I]t is clear beyond
88

Id. at 203. The Court cited the following as reasons why arbitration might lead to a
different result: (1) no right to trial by jury; (2) arbitrators not having “the benefit of
judicial instruction on the law”; (3) no reasoned opinions; (4) limited record; and (5)
limited review of awards. Id.
89
Id. This conclusion appeared to mean that when state arbitration law and the Act
conflicted in diversity cases, federal courts would have to apply state law under the
Guaranty Trust Co. test, thus possibly limiting the Act to federal question cases. Such a
limitation would have been problematic given that the Act was passed to enforce
arbitration agreements in diversity cases. See Moses, supra note 20, at 115–16. But because
this discussion was dicta, the question would be reserved for a future case. Also, I should
note that Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, actually called for the Act not to be
applicable in diversity cases. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 207–08 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
90
See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
91
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 137.
92
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
93
Id. at 402.
94
Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
95
Moses, supra note 20, at 117.
96
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400 n.3.
97
Id. at 403–04. In doing so the Court eliminated any doubt over whether the Act
applied in diversity cases involving interstate commerce. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at
138. The Prima Paint decision created what is known as the “separability rule.” Under this
rule, challenges to agreements as a whole are for the arbitrator to decide. And specific
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dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty.’”98 But nothing in the Act’s legislative history supports this.99 And,
because the Court didn’t specify that Congress never intended the Act to apply in
state courts, its reliance on the Commerce Clause100 invented a basis for arguing
that the Act created substantive rights that would preempt conflicting state laws.101
This made it “logically inescapable” that the Act would eventually apply in state,
not just federal, court.102 And that is precisely what the Court did in Southland
Corp. v. Keating in 1984.103
In Southland, the Court finally (and erroneously) described the Act as a
substantive federal law that would trump conflicting state laws in state court.104
Southland thus divorced the Act from its legislative history and freed the Court to
create an Act of its choosing.105 To help in that creation, the Court relied on its
recently created “national policy favoring arbitration.”106 This soon became one of
the Court’s key justifications for further expanding the Act to (1) cover statutory
disputes and employment agreements, (2) preempt state consumer-protection laws,
and (3) eliminate arbitration’s consent requirement.107
For example, the following year in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,108 the Court cited its national policy and found that

challenges to arbitration clauses are reserved for the courts. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at
403–04.
98
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405. The Court also said that the admiralty and commerce
powers “formed the principal bases of the legislation” and that Congress’s power over
federal courts, if relied on at all, was “supplementary.” Id. at 405 n.13.
99
See supra Part I.B.
100
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405; see also Moses, supra note 20, at 121–22.
101
Moses, supra note 20, at 121–22.
102
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 138.
103
465 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1984). The Court foreshadowed this result one year earlier in
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). There, in dicta,
the Court said: (1) that Congress, through the Act, created a body of substantive federal law
that governed in either state or federal court; and (2) that Congress, through the Act,
created a liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration. Id. at 24. Neither statement is
supported by legislative history.
104
465 U.S. at 11–12 (stating that the Act “rests on the authority of Congress to enact
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause” and that passing the Act under the
Commerce Clause “clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in
state as well as federal courts”).
105
Moses, supra note 20, at 130, 149.
106
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10. The Court first announced this policy one year
earlier in dicta in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. The national policy had no
basis in the Act’s legislative history. Moses, supra note 20, at 123 (“The 1925 Congress
never indicated in the slightest way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial
resolution of disputes.”).
107
Moses, supra note 20, at 99–100.
108
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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arbitration was an appropriate forum for resolving statutory disputes.109 To support
its decision, it said: “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”110 But this statement
directly contradicted Julius Cohen’s earlier limiting statements111 and the
Bernhardt Court’s skepticism toward arbitration.112 The Court swept aside these
concerns, stating simply, “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”113
The Court then continued its proarbitration trend in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,114 a 1991 decision where it held that ADEA claims
are arbitrable.115 It did so despite its prior statement in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co.116 that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of
contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the
final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”117 The Gilmer Court also addressed,
in a footnote, whether employment disputes can be arbitrated.118 The Court

109

Id. at 626–27. The claims in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. arose under the Sherman
Act. Id. at 616. The Court would later expand the Act to cover other statutory disputes as
well. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (finding
that ADEA claims are subject to mandatory arbitration).
110
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
111
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 30, at 281 (stating that arbitration “is not the proper
method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions
or policy in the application of statutes” and that such questions are better reserved for
“skilled judges”). Cohen admittedly was not a member of Congress when Congress passed
the Act, but he did draft the Act and testify about its meaning before Congress, which is
why I place importance on his statements.
112
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (“[T]he remedy by
arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action
created by the State.”).
113
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626–27. The Court confirmed this view in
1987 in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (“This
duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an
agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.”). The Court also said that the party
trying to avoid arbitration has the burden of showing that Congress did not intend for the
statutory claims in question to be arbitrated. Id. at 226–27.
114
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
115
Id. at 35.
116
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
117
Id. at 56.
118
Specifically, it asked whether Gilmer could avoid arbitration under the Act
because of Section 1’s exclusion of “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2; see also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Gilmer had signed an industrywide “securities registration application” that mandated arbitration of any disputes between
himself and his employer, Interstate. Id. at 25 n.2. After being fired, Gilmer sued Interstate
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ultimately sidestepped the question with thin reasoning,119 which foreshadowed its
subsequent decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.120 There, it explicitly
held that the Act covers disputes between employers and employees,121 despite W.
H. H. Piatt’s assurance at the 1923 hearing that it was not “an act referring to labor
disputes at all.”122
Cases like Mitsubishi Motors and Gilmer exhibited the Court’s belief that
arbitration was an appropriate forum for resolving most disputes. Its next major
step was to increase the number of disputes potentially falling within the Federal
Arbitration Act’s scope. In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,123 the
Court found that Section 2’s coverage of contracts “evidencing a transaction
involving commerce” reached the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers.124 In other words, the Court adopted the broadest possible definition of
“involving commerce,” meaning that the Act would apply to all “commerce in
fact.”125 This reading of the phrase reduced the likelihood that disputes would be
covered by state arbitration acts instead of the Federal Arbitration Act, thus
pushing the Act “further into the realm of state court jurisprudence.”126
Then, the following year in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,127 the Court
severely restricted states’ abilities to pass laws regulating arbitration covered by
the Act.128 Specifically, the Court found that lower courts could not “invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions.”129 This meant that state legislatures could protect consumers and
others from mandatory arbitration only through laws dealing with purely local

for age discrimination in a federal district court. Id. at 23. Interstate then moved to compel
arbitration under the “application.” Id. at 23–24.
119
The Court sidestepped the question by finding that the industry-wide “securities
registration application” signed by Gilmer was neither an employment contract nor part of
an employment contract. Id. at 25 n.2.
120
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
121
Id. at 123–24.
122
Id. at 127; see also 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt,
Chairman, Committee of Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar
Association). The Court explicitly refused to consider the Act’s legislative history. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119. It based its decision on the text of Section 1, stating that
the text was clear. Id. at 114–15. Never mind that it applied the principle of ejusdem
generis, which typically is used only if the text doesn’t give a direct answer.
123
513 U.S. 265 (1995).
124
Id. at 268 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
125
Id. at 281 (“[W]e accept the ‘commerce in fact’ interpretation, reading the Act’s
language as insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact ‘involv[e]’ interstate commerce, even if
the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection.”).
126
Sternlight, supra note 59, at 665.
127
517 U.S. 681 (1996).
128
Id. at 687.
129
Id.
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transactions or through laws dealing with contracts generally.130 In other words, the
Court had further frustrated states’ abilities to protect consumers from
overreaching arbitration agreements because Allied-Bruce left relatively few
arbitration disputes outside the scope of the Act.
Overall, the Court’s opinions—including some of its more recent ones131—
demonstrate that it will compel arbitration despite conflicting precedent, contrary
legislative history, or other concerns about arbitration in any particular case (e.g.,
disparities in bargaining power132). Its reasoning appears to be based on a desire to
reduce judicial caseloads—a worthy goal no doubt.133 But whether that goal should
trump concerns over the loss of individual rights through mandatory arbitration
remains an open question—one that consumers, employees, and franchisees are
increasingly urging lower courts and Congress to address.
III. THE RISING LIBERAL RESPONSE TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION
As the Supreme Court expanded the Federal Arbitration Act’s scope and
simultaneously required lower courts to grant greater deference to parties’
arbitration agreements, the parties drafting these agreements increasingly included
unfair and overreaching terms. State legislatures could do little about this after
Doctor’s Associates.134 This left parties with two basic methods to seek relief from
unfair agreements: (1) through the unconscionability doctrine in lower courts and
(2) through Congress.
The unconscionability doctrine, when applied, allows parties to avoid the
most oppressive mandatory arbitration agreements. But it does not provide widescale relief; it simply allows courts to review agreements on a case-by-case
basis.135 That is why advocates for eliminating mandatory arbitration have asked
130

See Sternlight, supra note 59, at 668. After Allied-Bruce, fewer arbitration disputes
were considered local disputes. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 256,
281 (1995).
131
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(upholding a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement); Rent-a-Ctr., W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 (2010) (limiting nondrafting parties’ ability to have the
arbitrability question decided by courts instead of arbitrators).
132
See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229–30
(1987) (finding the voluntariness of an agreement irrelevant to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements).
133
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172 (“[T]he Court is motivated to reduce the cases
having to be tried by the judicial system, particularly the federal judicial system.”).
134
See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that arbitration
agreements could not be invalidated by state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions).
135
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1442 (2008)
(“[U]nconscionability does not completely address the problem: Many of the features of
arbitration clauses that are often challenged as unconscionable really do not strike one as a
gross imposition on the particular person at issue but rather strike at more broadly based
considerations of public policy.”).
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Congress for protection.136 They want Congress to preclude companies from
requiring their customers, employees, and franchisees to arbitrate disputes.
This section explores those parties’ increased reliance on the
unconscionability doctrine after Doctor’s Associates and the Supreme Court’s
most recent attempts to limit the doctrine’s use. It also addresses these parties’
efforts in Congress during this period, showing that their efforts have increased in
lockstep with their reliance on the unconscionability doctrine. So far neither
Congress nor the unconscionability doctrine has produced the results that these
reform advocates want—mandatory arbitration’s wholesale elimination. But that
could change as they continue pressing for relief.
A. The Rise (and Ultimate Fall) of Unconscionability
Section 2 of the Act allows courts to invalidate arbitration agreements “upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”137 Put
differently, courts may invalidate arbitration agreements under general state laws
that would make any contract unenforceable.138 “Unconscionability” is one such
law.
Although the unconscionability doctrine is at least two and a half centuries
old, courts have not yet agreed on how to define it.139 In part, this is because it
requires a fact-based inquiry, the results of which will vary from case to case.140
Nevertheless, courts have developed a two-part test for applying the doctrine. First,
the party challenging the arbitration agreement must prove that the manner in
which it was asked to arbitrate was somehow unfair (e.g., through an adhesion

136

See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. § 748(n)(1)–(2) (2010) (giving a proposed agency the power to prohibit
or impose limitations of mandatory arbitration by rule if the agency decides such a rule
would benefit the public interest).
137
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
138
See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422.
139
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 792–94 (2004) (citing Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
(1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100).
140
Take, for example, the UCC’s definition of unconscionability. It recognizes that
whether unconscionability exists depends on the circumstances existing at the time of the
contract. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2010) (“The basic test is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,
the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract.”); see also Sandra F. Gavin,
Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10
Years after Doctor’s Associate’s, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 264 (2006)
(“[T]he unconscionability defense may be predicated upon a variety of factors and is a case
sensitive analysis.”).
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contract).141 This is known as procedural unconscionability.142 Second, the party
challenging the agreement must demonstrate that the agreement’s terms are too
unreasonable to warrant judicial enforcement.143 This is known as substantive
unconscionability.144 Some courts require parties to satisfy both tests before
invalidating an agreement.145 Others find that substantive unconscionability is
enough.146
As one might imagine, this fact-based inquiry makes it relatively easy for
courts to invalidate arbitration agreements with little chance of being reversed on
appeal.147 While they are not supposed to interpret arbitration agreements any
differently than other contracts under state law,148 reviewing courts find it difficult
to tell if lower courts did so.149 Thus, lower courts have been able to use the
141

See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that procedural unconscionability, or “unfair surprise,” occurs where an agreement is
reached but the language is “convoluted or unclear” creating contractual terms not typically
expected by the party who is asked to assent).
142
See Stempel, supra note 139, at 794 (stating that procedural unconscionability
“involves unfair contracting practices”).
143
See Harris, 183 F.3d at 181 (recognizing that substantive unconscionability occurs
where contractual terms are “unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which
the disfavored party does not assent”).
144
See Stempel, supra note 139, at 794 (“Substantive unconscionability involved
terms that—no matter how openly set forth or voluntarily accepted—are simply too unfair
to merit judicial enforcement.”). Here are a few provisions that courts may find
substantively unconscionable: limitations on damages; imposition of excessive fees;
selection of an inconvenient forum; unreasonably short deadlines for filing claims, etc. Id.
at 804–07.
145
See, e.g., Harris, 183 F.3d at 181 (stating that “unconscionability” requires both
procedural and substantive unconscionability); see also Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration
Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver
and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 477, 490 (2009) (“The arbitration clause contestant must prove that the clause was
either procedurally unconscionable or substantively unconscionable, and in most states,
both.”).
146
See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1220 n.5 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The
subscribers also argue on appeal that the class action waiver is procedurally
unconscionable. We do not address this argument since we conclude infra that the clause is
substantively unconscionable and thus unenforceable as a matter of law.”).
147
See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422.
148
See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A court may not, then, in
assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement
in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements
under state law.”). Otherwise courts could do what state legislatures could not after
Doctor’s Associates. Id. (“Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for
this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot.”).
149
Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422 (“This difficulty creates opportunities for lower
courts to misapply, or perhaps even manipulate, state contract doctrines so as to nullify
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unconscionability doctrine to avoid the Supreme Court’s arbitration mandate.150 In
fact, it has been the main method for invalidating awards under Section 2 for
“courts skeptical of the increasingly pervasive use of arbitration.”151
But there was a lag between when the Supreme Court created the “national
policy favoring arbitration” and when lower courts began employing
unconscionability as a ground for invalidating awards. In the two years before
Southland, for example, a study by Susan Randall found only fifty-four
unconscionability cases, eight of which involved arbitration agreements.152 And
only one of those eight unconscionability challenges succeeded.153 After
Southland, this general trend continued as courts mostly followed the Supreme
Court’s proarbitration rulings.154 But as the Court became more aggressively
proarbitration—for example, when it eliminated state legislatures’ ability to
regulate arbitration agreements in Doctor’s Associates—unconscionability
challenges became much more common.155 Consider the following chart156 created
by Aaron-Andrew Bruhl:

arbitration agreements while simultaneously frustrating the ability of reviewing courts to
reverse.”).
150
See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability
Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 40 (2006) (“Although ostensibly applying the ‘generally
applicable’ contract defense of unconscionability, in cases involving the validity of
arbitration agreements the California courts routinely apply an entirely different test,
requiring less of parties seeking to avoid arbitration.”); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial
Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements
to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470–71 (stating that lower courts, through the
unconscionability doctrine, have “gone too far” in failing to follow Supreme Court
precedent); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 198 (2004) (“An examination of the application
of unconscionability to similar issues in arbitration and nonarbitration contexts supports the
conclusion that judges are avoiding arbitration through arbitration-specific expansions of
the doctrine of unconscionability.”).
151
Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1422. It is a form of strategic judging that allows the
lower courts to “insulate their rulings from reversal by ideologically adverse reviewing
courts.” Id. at 1425.
152
Randall, supra note 150, at 196.
153
Id.
154
See Stempel, supra note 139, at 798.
155
See id. at 761–62 (stating that the use of unconscionability “accelerated in the late
1990s”). Because the Court had finally cut off state legislatures’ ability to regulate
arbitration agreements, state courts tried to implement the legislatures’ policy wishes
through judicial measures. See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1434–35 (“State courts that resist
the Supreme Court’s federal policy favoring arbitration are in many cases trying to
effectuate not their own preferences but fundamental state legislative policies that restrict
arbitration or apply heightened procedural safeguards.”).
156
Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1440.
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Bruhl’s chart shows that unconscionability challenges began increasing
around 1995 and that the upward trend more or less continued through 2007, when
the challenges constituted approximately 19 percent of all arbitration cases.157 And
while this shows only the increased use of the unconscionability defense, some
evidence exists that the defense’s success rate also increased during this period.
For example, Randall’s study showed that parties succeeded in approximately 50
percent of their unconscionability challenges from 2002 to 2003, compared to a
12.5 percent success rate from 1982 to 1983.158 So, in addition to unconscionability
157

Id. To see if parties are still using the unconscionability defense as frequently
today, I ran a search using Bruhl’s parameters and found 76 cases involving
unconscionability challenges between July 1, 2009 and July 1, 2010. As Bruhl noted in his
article, this search method isn’t flawless, but at the very least it provides a general idea of
the prevalence of the unconscionability doctrine today.
158
Randall, supra note 150, at 194–96. In 1982–83, parties successfully used the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration agreements in 12.5 percent of the cases
in Randall’s study. Id. at 196. And they succeeded at a rate of 15.2 percent in
unconscionability challenges to other types of agreements. Id. By 2002–03, the numbers
were 50.3 percent and 25.6 percent, respectively. Id. at 194. In other words, by 2002–03,
courts appeared to be twice as willing to use the unconscionability doctrine in the context
of arbitration, which is a pretty significant change from the parity that existed in 1982–83.
See id. at 194–96; see also Broome, supra note 150, at 48 (studying California appellate
court decisions and finding that “as a purely empirical matter, unconscionability challenges
succeed with far greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue is an arbitration
agreement”). While this increased success rate could be due to an increase in the
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challenges becoming more prevalent, it appears that lower courts have become
more receptive to those challenges as well.159
This upswing in the unconscionability doctrine’s use and success occurred
despite several movements at the end of the twentieth century that sought to limit
judicial power, such as the rise of law and economics analysis, strong academic
criticisms of the unconscionability doctrine generally, and a push for greater
judicial restraint.160 It was the best remaining defense that lower courts had against
the Supreme Court’s arbitration mandate, so they used it regardless of contrary
intellectual and political trends.161 In response, the Supreme Court began shifting
decision making authority away from courts and toward arbitrators, thus reducing
lower courts’ ability to use the unconscionability doctrine to nullify unreasonable
arbitration agreements.162
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,163 for example, the Florida
Supreme Court had refused to compel arbitration because it found the underlying
contract “void for illegality.”164 The Supreme Court reversed, relying on

prevalence of unconscionable arbitration clauses, the sheer size of the increase, along with
an examination of the case law, indicates that courts are subjecting arbitration agreements
to increased scrutiny under the unconscionability doctrine. See Bruhl, supra note 135, at
1441–42, 1455–64.
159
On a related note, the overall hostility toward the Supreme Court’s arbitration
mandate appears to be increasing. Take two anecdotal examples. First, twenty state
attorneys general joined the respondents in Allied-Bruce in asking the Court to overturn
Southland. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995). And,
forty states, along with Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, asked the Court to
overturn Southland in Buckeye Check Cashing. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 441 (2006) (listing the attorneys general who submitted an Amici
Curiae brief in support of respondents); Brief of Florida et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (No. 041264), 2005 WL 2477361. Second, lower courts are vocalizing their displeasure with the
Supreme Court’s proarbitration rulings. Two judges on the Minnesota Supreme Court, for
example, refused to sign an order compelling arbitration after the Doctor’s Associates case
was remanded to it by the Supreme Court. They said: “[w]e cannot in good conscience be
an instrument of a policy which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental, and
philosophically misguided as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in this and other cases
which interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act.” Richard C. Reuben, Western
Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S. Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at
16; see also Randall, supra note 150, at 220–21 (referencing Montana Supreme Court’s
refusal to sign an order pending arbitration).
160
See Stempel, supra note 139, at 812–40.
161
See id.
162
Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1470–86. Part of what no doubt caught the Court’s
attention was the increased number of certiorari petitions received in recent years that
raised the unconscionability issue. Id. at 1466.
163
546 U.S. 440 (2006).
164
Id. at 442–43. The underlying contract was a “Deferred Deposit and Disclosure
Agreement” that charged, according to the lower court, usurious interest rates. Id.
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Southland165 and Prima Paint.166 Specifically, the Court said that Southland made
the Federal Arbitration Act applicable in state courts and that Prima Paint required
arbitrators, not courts, to decide challenges to the contract as a whole.167 The
Florida Supreme Court thought it could avoid Prima Paint’s severability rule by
finding the contract void ab initio168 rather than voidable, as in Prima Paint.169 The
Supreme Court found this distinction irrelevant and ordered the parties to
arbitrate.170 Overall, the case reminded lower courts of the Supreme Court’s ability
to shift decision making authority to arbitrators and thereby reduce their roles in
monitoring arbitration agreements.171
In fact, Buckeye Check Cashing foreshadowed the Court’s most recent
decision in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.172 Rent-a-Center involved an
arbitration agreement with a delegation clause that assigned disputes over the
agreement’s enforceability to the arbitrator.173 Jackson challenged the agreement,
claiming that some of its provisions (e.g., a provision requiring the parties to split
arbitration fees) were unconscionable.174 By specifically challenging the arbitration
provisions, it appeared that Jackson had complied with Prima Paint and Buckeye
Check Cashing. But the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Jackson’s challenge
to the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator under the delegation
clause.175 This appears to mean that any time an arbitration agreement has a
delegation clause similar to Jackson’s, the only way to raise an unconscionability

165

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406–07 (1967).
Recall that the separability rule from Prima Paint requires (a) arbitrators to review
challenges to an agreement as a whole and (b) courts to review challenges to the arbitration
clause. Id. at 403–04. In other words, the separability rule is a rule for determining who
decides.
167
Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445–46.
168
Void ab initio means “[n]ull from the beginning, as from the first moment when a
contract is entered into.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (9th ed. 2009).
169
Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 446 (“In declining to apply Prima Paint’s
rule of severability, the Florida Supreme Court relied on the distinction between void and
voidable contracts.”).
170
Id. at 446, 449.
171
See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1474–75 (noting that the allocation rule “greatly
facilitates federal monitoring of the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”).
172
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
173
Id. at 2775. Specifically, the delegation clause stated that the arbitrator “shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability,
enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that
all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” Id.
174
Id. at 2775–76.
175
Id. at 2779. To reach this conclusion, the Court had to use some pretty tortured
logic. Namely, it said that the arbitration agreement in this case was the entire agreement
and, therefore, that Jackson’s claim had to be arbitrated under Prima Paint. Id. at 2778–81.
166
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challenge in court is to challenge the delegation clause itself.176 Only then will the
court be able to hear unconscionability challenges to the arbitration agreement as a
whole.177 Thus, inserting these delegation clauses in arbitration agreements will
make it more difficult—if not impossible—for nondrafting parties to challenge the
agreements’ substantive provisions in court. In effect, the court’s role may be
limited “to little more than rubber-stamping motions to compel arbitration.”178
B. Reform Advocates Seek Congressional Relief
Even before the Court’s recent Rent-a-Center decision, reform advocates had
started seeking Congressional relief against companies that mandated arbitration.
Using the unconscionability doctrine didn’t fully resolve the mandatory-arbitration
problem—it worked only on a case-by-case basis.179 Plus, parties subjected to
mandatory arbitration generally found the process fundamentally unfair. They
believed they were being subjected to a biased process that limited their
substantive and procedural rights,180 and they wanted Congress to preclude its use.
Between 1995 and 2010, members of Congress introduced 139 bills that
sought either to (a) eliminate mandatory arbitration for certain categories of
disputes or (b) restrict the ways in which companies can use it. Nineteen ninetyfive was the year before Doctor’s Associates, and using it as a start date for
surveying Congress’s activity provides helpful perspective for determining
whether there is a congressional trend that mirrors the unconscionability trend in

176

Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Even when a litigant has specifically
challenged the validity of an agreement to arbitrate he must submit that challenge to the
arbitrator unless he has lodged an objection to the particular line in the agreement that
purports to assign such challenges to the arbitrator – the so-called ‘delegation clause.’”).
177
Id. Put differently, parties may waive their right to challenge an arbitration clause
in court, which is problematic because courts traditionally have protected individuals from
substantively unfair arbitration clauses through the unconscionability doctrine. See David
Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 1, 5–6 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/04/02/horton.pdf. In
fact, Section 4 says that courts “shall hear the parties” and that courts should compel
arbitration only “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is
not in issue.” 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Also, Julius Cohen assured Congress at the 1924 Joint
Hearings that the Act provided protections against forcing parties to arbitrate without some
measure of judicial review. See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 35 (brief submitted
by Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce) (stating
that a party who in good faith refuses to arbitrate because she believes she is not bound by
the agreement “is protected by the provision of the law which requires the court to examine
into the merits of such a claim”).
178
See Horton, supra note 177, at 2.
179
See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 1441–43.
180
See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER TOPICS 4–9 (5th ed. 2007).
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lower courts.181 Not surprisingly, there is. While individual parties were increasing
their challenges to arbitration provisions in the courts,182 advocacy groups
increasingly challenged them in Congress. Here’s a breakdown of the number of
bills introduced during this period:
35
30
25
20
15
10

No. of bills for each
Congress

5
0

As the list in the Appendix183 explains, some of these bills were arbitration
specific,184 and others suggested changes to arbitration laws as a small part of a
larger act.185 In either case, most bills died in committee; many were reintroduced
in following years only to meet the same fate; and the few that ultimately passed
applied only to relatively narrow categories of disputes.
In fact, of the 139 Congressional antiarbitration bills, only five passed both
houses and became law during this period. The first was the Motor Vehicle
181

What I mean, specifically, is that I wanted to see if members of Congress began
introducing more anti-arbitration bills post-Doctor’s Associates, just as the use of the
unconscionability doctrine increased in lower courts post-Doctor’s Associates. See Bruhl,
supra note 135, at 1440.
182
See id.
183
See infra Part VI.
184
See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 9, United States Code, to Allow Employees the
Right to Accept or Reject the Use of Arbitration to Resolve an Employment Controversy,
H.R. 613, 106th Cong. (1999) (allowing arbitration only where one party requests it and the
other party consents in writing within 60 days).
185
See, e.g., Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2000, H.R. 3901, 106th Cong. (2000)
(including a provision that high-cost mortgages may not include a mandatory arbitration
clause that limits a borrower’s right to seek relief through judicial review).
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Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, which failed in the 105th and 106th
Congresses before finally passing in the 107th.186 It was limited to prohibiting
motor vehicle manufacturers, importers, and distributors from mandating
arbitration under their franchise agreements.187 The second was the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which passed the 109th
Congress.188 It contained a provision exempting military personnel and their
dependents from having to arbitrate consumer-credit disputes.189 The third was the
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, which contained a provision
allowing parties to opt out of arbitration under livestock and poultry contracts.190
Senators Feingold and Grassley introduced bills with comparable provisions
in three prior Congresses before finally passing this one in the 110th.191 The fourth
was the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, which contained a
provision prohibiting the government from contracting with employers that require
arbitration of “any claim under [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any
tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including assault and
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, or
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.”192 Popularly known as the Franken
Anti-Rape Amendment, this provision passed the 111th Congress after the uproar
over the dispute between Jamie Leigh Jones and KBR.193 Finally, the 111th
186

See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140,
107th Cong. (2001); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001,
H.R. 1296, 107th Cong. (2001); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2000, H.R. 534, 106th Cong. (2000); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration
Fairness Act of 1999, S. 1020, 106th Cong. (1999); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract
Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2434, 105th Cong. (1998).
187
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1140, 107th
Cong. (2001). The bill defined motor vehicle franchise contracts as contracts “under which
a motor vehicle manufacturer, importer, or distributor sells motor vehicles to any other
person for resale to an ultimate purchaser and authorizes such other person to repair and
service the manufacturer’s motor vehicles.” Id. § 2. The bill said that if a motor vehicle
franchise contract called for arbitration of disputes, then the parties to the contract would
be able to opt out of that provision after any dispute arose. Id. If the parties chose to
proceed with arbitration, then the bill required the arbitrator to provide a written
explanation of the basis for the award. Id.
188
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122,
109th Cong. (2006).
189
See id. § 670.
190
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 210
(2008).
191
See Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2005, S. 2131, 109th Cong. (2005); Fair
Contracts for Growers Act of 2003, S. 91, 108th Cong. (2003); Fair Contracts for Growers
Act of 2002, S. 2943, 107th Cong. (2002).
192
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. §
8116(a)(1) (2009).
193
See Amanda Terkel, Obama Signs Franken’s Anti-rape Amendment into Law,
THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 21, 2009, 1:50 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2009 /12/21/obama-
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Congress also passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.194 Among other things, this Act gave the SEC authority to restrict
or prohibit mandatory arbitration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.195 It also created a Consumer Protection
Financial Bureau that will have the same power over arbitration provisions in
“consumer financial products and services” agreements.196 It is the only bill of the
five that even considered regulation as a means for dealing with mandatory
arbitration.197
In fact, the overwhelming majority of the 139 bills introduced since 1995
proposed eliminating, rather than regulating, mandatory arbitration. And the bills
that proposed regulating mandatory arbitration generally received little, if any,
widespread support. Consider, for example, two bills Senator Sessions introduced
in the 106th, 107th, and 110th Congresses, respectively: the Consumer and
Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights; the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002; and the
Fair Arbitration Act of 2007.198 Each applied to “consumer” and “employment”
agreements, which were broadly defined.199 Also, each bill’s substance was the
same—they all sought to regulate the circumstances under which parties could
mandate arbitration.200 In other words, they did not seek to eliminate mandatory

franken/ (noting that many republicans faced “intense political blowback” because of their
opposition to the legislation and referring to it as an “unnecessary attack on their allies in
the private contracting business”).
194
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2010).
195
Id. § 921. It also exempted certain Truth in Lending Act claims and certain
whistleblower retaliation claims from mandatory arbitration. Id. §§ 748, 922, 1057.
196
See id. § 1028. The new Bureau will be part of the Federal Reserve, but the
Reserve will have little oversight over it. Basically, the Reserve will simply fund its
operations. See id. § 1012.
197
See id. § 1028.
198
Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002); Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of
Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000).
199
“Consumer” agreements included “the sale or rental of goods, services, or real
property, including an extension of credit or the provision of any other financial product or
service, to an individual in a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.” See, e.g., S. 3210 § 2(a). “Employment” agreements meant “a
uniform, employer promulgated plan that covers all employees in a company, facility, or
work grade, and that may cover legally protected rights or statutory rights” and did “not
include any individually negotiated executive employment agreements.” Id.
200
Each bill would have required arbitration clauses: (1) to have their headings in
bold, capital letters; (2) to state whether arbitration is mandatory or optional; (3) to provide
contact information for a source where contracting parties can get more information on the
arbitration process; and (4) to allow parties to have the option of resolving disputes under
$50,000 in small claims court. The bills also would have entitled parties: (1) to competent
and neutral arbitrators; (2) to representation and a fair hearing; (3) to present evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, and have a record of the proceedings; and (4) to timely resolution
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arbitration, as most other bills during this period did. Instead, they sought to
control how it could be carried out.201 None of Sessions’s bills had cosponsors, and
all three died without hearings in the Senate Judiciary Committee.202
In contrast, the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2007 and 2009 were two of the
more widely publicized reform bills introduced during this period. The 2007 Act
applied to employment, consumer, and franchise disputes, as well as disputes
under statutes intended to (1) protect civil rights or (2) regulate contracts between
parties with unequal bargaining power.203 The 2009 Act covers the same disputes,
except that it does not include the unequal bargaining power provision.204 Both
Acts would eliminate, rather than regulate, mandatory arbitration for the covered
disputes.205 Although both ultimately died in committee, they have received far
greater attention and support in Congress than Sessions’s bills did.206 For example,
the 2007 Act had a total of 110 cosponsors in both houses and the 2009 Act had
127.207 Also, unlike any of Sessions’s bills, subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the 2007 Act.208
and a written award. See S. 1135 § 2; S. 3026 § 2; S. 3210 § 2. These bills were unique in
that they did not try to eliminate mandatory arbitration outright.
201
S. 3026 § 2; S. 3210 § 2.
202
S. 3026; S. 3210. To clarify Sessions’s role in mandatory-arbitration reform, I do
not believe he falls within my definition of “reform groups” or “reform advocates.” As one
anecdotal, but telling, example, he opposed the Franken Amendment to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, saying that it “would impose the will of Congress on
private individuals and companies in a retroactive fashion, invalidating employment
contracts without due process of law.” See Ryan Grim, Defense Department Opposed
Franken’s Anti-Rape Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2009, 7:14 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/19/defense-department-oppose_n_326569.html
(last visited on Nov. 7, 2011).
203
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
204
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
205
See S. 931 § 3; H.R. 1020 § 4; S. 1782 § 4. And both would have a court, rather
than an arbitrator, decide initial challenges to an arbitration agreement, thus eliminating
Prima Paint’s severability rule. Id.; S. 1782 § 4.
206
The Arbitration Fairness Acts have also received greater academic attention. See,
e.g., Bradley Dillon-Coffman, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to the
Arbitration Fairness Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2010); Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in
a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of Mandatory Binding
Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075 (2010); Peter B. Rutledge,
Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 267 (2008).
207
Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010) S. 93, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s931: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill
Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 1020, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h1020: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill
Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008) S. 1792, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:s1782: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill
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In short, it appears that reform groups have been pushing Congress to
eliminate, rather than to regulate, mandatory arbitration—a short-sighted approach
that disregards mandatory arbitration’s public benefits (e.g., reducing judicial
caseloads and lowering companies’ dispute-resolution costs) and makes arbitration
itself seem like the problem. The problem is not arbitration itself; rather, the
problem is that companies have abused mandatory arbitration because the Supreme
Court has allowed them to do so. The solution, then, is not to eliminate mandatory
arbitration but to keep it in place (at least for now) and to regulate it to prevent its
past abuses from continuing. This pragmatic approach gives companies a cheaper,
alternative method for resolving disputes while also protecting individual rights
previously lost in mandatory arbitration.
IV. EMBRACING REGULATION IN MANDATORY ARBITRATION
So far I’ve addressed the Supreme Court’s success with arbitration formalism
and the mixed accomplishments of the reform advocates’ liberal response. In other
words, I’ve addressed whether these two movements have, in fact, worked.
Separate from the question of whether the movements have worked is the question
of whether they should work. This Part demonstrates that both movements are
flawed and that adopting a goal-oriented pragmatic approach, one that regulates
mandatory arbitration’s use to improve its overall fairness, makes more sense.
A. The Problems with Supreme Court Formalism
Defining formalism is complicated because numerous conflicting versions
exist.209 One common definition, however, explains formalism as “the use of
deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted as
authoritative.”210 And because formalism restricts or eliminates courts’ discretion
to make exceptions to a given rule, it is sometimes referred to as “mechanical

Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008) H.R. 3010, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h3010: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
208
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007).
209
See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy:
Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1443, 1449–50 (2008); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
607, 609 n.6 (1999).
210
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1987); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
959, 959 (1997) (“The decisions were formalistic in that they reasoned deductively from
minimally justified premises and expressly eschewed consideration of what result would be
best from a policy perspective.”).
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jurisprudence.”211 Courts simply look at the rule, decide what conclusion would
further that rule given the facts, and then reach that conclusion without considering
policies that might justify a different outcome.212
The Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions fall within this general description
of formalism.213 The Court uses the “national policy favoring arbitration” and
“party autonomy” as its major premises for deriving case outcomes. Given these
premises’ nature, and given the Court’s general refusal to consider policy concerns
regarding arbitration’s potential for abuse,214 the outcome of any given case seems
pre-ordained. In fact, over the last twenty-five years, the Court has mechanically
relied on the “national policy” and “party autonomy” to expand the Federal
Arbitration Act’s scope beyond Congress’s original intent.215 Consequently,

211

See Bridgeman, supra note 209, at 1449 (“The traditional definition offered is the
familiar caricature of classical formalism as ‘mechanical jurisprudence.’”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 638–39
(1999) (stating that formalism is an attempt to make the law deductive “in the sense that
judges decide cases mechanically on the basis of preexisting law and do not exercise
discretion in individual cases”).
212
See Sunstein, supra note 211, at 638–39.
213
MACNEIL, supra note 16, at viii (describing the reasoning in the Court’s arbitration
decisions over the last twenty-five years as “bureaucratic formalism”). The Court
sometimes claims to base its decisions in textualist terms. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (2009) (“We cannot rely on this judicial policy concern as a
source of authority for introducing a qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its
text.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (“As the conclusion
we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we need not assess the legislative history of
the exclusion provision.”). But this is really a form of “no-text textualism.” Margaret L.
Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825, 826 (2010) (explaining that the Court uses “no-text
textualism” to “reinvent statutes, abandon precedent, and create its own norms in the field
of arbitration”). Thus, I believe formalism is a better descriptive term than textualism for
the Court’s decision making in the arbitration context. See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at viii;
see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1418, 1428 (1996)
(explaining how the Court uses “wooden formalism” to reach its arbitration decisions).
214
For example, the Court has disregarded legitimate concerns regarding parties’ lack
of consent and arbitration’s unsuitability for certain disputes. See, e.g., Shearson/Am.
Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229–31 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–28 (1984).
215
See, e.g., Rent-a-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (stating
that the Act “reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract,” and
enforcing a contractual provision that made the parties submit arbitrability issues to the
arbitrator); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (compelling
arbitration of a statutory claim and stating that sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act reflect the
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”).
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mandatory arbitration has increased significantly.216 But the Court has shown little
concern; its goal, after all, has been to reduce judicial caseloads, and using these
premises allows it to achieve that goal.217
The Court’s arbitration formalism is subject to at least three criticisms:
rigidity; overdependence on deductive reasoning; and reliance on false premises.
First, formalism is too rigid. The Court treats the “national policy” and “party
autonomy” as immutable rules that demand arbitration’s expansion. It refuses to
make policy-based exceptions to those rules.218 And it has shown little willingness
to reshape those rules as parties’ use of arbitration has changed over time.219 For
example, as businesses increasingly required arbitration in response to the Court’s
proarbitration decisions, they simultaneously began limiting nondrafting parties’
procedural rights during those arbitrations.220 The Court has done little to correct
this behavior, relying on formal logic instead of experience to continue expanding
the Act.221 This failure to respond is why consumers, employees, and franchisees
increasingly have asked Congress for relief, and it is why their requests have
become more successful.222
The second criticism of the Court’s arbitration formalism is that it emphasizes
the deductive process over the choice of premises.223 Put differently, the Court
216

See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1632–33 (2005) (explaining how the “federal policy” spawned an increase in
mandatory arbitration).
217
See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172 (“One cannot immerse oneself in the
arbitration cases without coming to the conclusion that a major force driving the Court is
docket-clearing pure and simple. That is, the Court is motivated to reduce the cases having
to be tried by the judicial system, particularly the federal judicial system.”).
218
See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626.
219
This is a central problem with formalism. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1990) (explaining that “[f]ormalism contains a built-in
bias against legal change”).
220
For example, some mandatory arbitration agreements contain provisions that
severely limit discovery, eliminate the right to class actions, forbid cross-examination of
witnesses, and impose biased arbitrators. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with
Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 262–63 (2004).
221
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (49th prtg. 1949) (“The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). This is problematic given that
many of these changes resulted from the Court’s own decisions. This is what I mean by
saying that the Court’s stance is too rigid. See generally Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist
and Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 119, 121–22
(1985) (stating that a formalist court will rely “on existing legal rules and logical deduction
to decide any and all cases presented to it,” and that, as a result, legal rules become “rigidly
unchangeable”).
222
For example, the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act gives the proposed agency the power to either eliminate or regulate
mandatory arbitration in certain categories of disputes. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1028(b) (2010).
223
See POSNER, supra note 219, at 38–42.
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gives the impression that its premises (“party autonomy” and the “national policy”)
are self-evident and then deduces an outcome that is inevitable given the premises
used.224 This makes it appear that the Court’s decision making abilities are
limited—that it has no other choice but to rule a certain way.225 Correctly choosing
premises is more difficult than correctly deriving an outcome from given
premises.226 So instead of focusing on the premises’ validity, the Court simply
selects premises and then focuses on deriving an outcome, which allows it to deny
that it is making any political or moral judgments.227 The problem is that these
denials are false.228 The Court makes political judgments when choosing premises
for its arbitration decisions. Specifically, it wants to reduce judicial caseloads.229
Choosing “party autonomy” and the “national policy favoring arbitration” as its
premises furthers that end.
Finally, the Court’s two premises are false.230 Congress did not create a
“national policy favoring arbitration” when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act.231
It simply created a procedural law that directed federal courts to enforce
merchants’ arbitration agreements.232 In fact, the Act’s legislative history makes
plain Congress’s intent,233 which likely explains why the Court failed to cite any
224

See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25, 33 (1991);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (1984); see also Posner, supra note 210, at
182 (stating that formalists want “to give the impression that the premises [are] selfevident—meanwhile packing as much into the major premises as possible, to shorten the
chain of deductions.”). The Court’s basic logic looks something like this: Congress created
a “national policy favoring arbitration” when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act. And
arbitration is a matter of contract, i.e., party autonomy. Accordingly, it makes logical sense
to broadly interpret the Act and vigorously enforce parties’ arbitration agreements.
225
See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL
FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY 32, 57 (2d ed. 2005) (“In treating judicial decision
making like mathematics, legal formalism creates the appearance that it is an apolitical
process.”).
226
See Posner, supra note 210, at 181–82.
227
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 24 (1996)
(“There is a pervasive impulse to formalism within the legal culture, though the impulse
moves to the fore in particular periods, when judges find it especially necessary to say that
their judgments about ‘what the law is’ do not rest on political and moral claims.”).
228
Id. (“The vice of formalism is found whenever people in law falsely deny that they
are making political and moral judgments.”).
229
See MACNEIL, supra note 16, at 172; Moses, supra note 20, at 156.
230
This is problematic because the truth of an outcome depends on the truth of its
premises. See POSNER, supra note 219, at 38.
231
Moses, supra note 20, at 123 (“The 1925 Congress never indicated in the slightest
way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial resolution of disputes. It simply made
arbitration of commercial and maritime agreements enforceable in federal court because,
until 1925, such agreements had essentially been revocable at will by the parties.”).
232
See supra Part I.
233
See supra Part I; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the
FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a
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authority when announcing the “national policy” in Southland.234 Also, the Court
gives too much credence to “party autonomy.” Saying that parties should be free to
negotiate the manner in which they resolve their disputes oversimplifies the
issue.235 Certain parties have little or no bargaining power, which means they have
no true choice in deciding whether to arbitrate.236 Thus, while arbitration may be a
“matter of contract,” certain contracts deserve greater scrutiny than others. Yet the
Court treats all arbitration agreements alike, citing “party autonomy” regardless of
the circumstances under which an agreement was signed.237
Together, these three criticisms illustrate the flaws in the Court’s arbitration
formalism and help explain why parties subjected to mandatory arbitration have
been advocating for reform. But whether these criticisms justify eliminating
mandatory arbitration—which is the most common reform being requested238—is
questionable because eliminating mandatory arbitration has its problems, too.
B. The Limitations of the Reform Advocates’ Liberal Response
Liberalism, like formalism, is hard to define. For starters, political liberalism
differs from legal liberalism. Oversimplified, the former involves a conception of
rights and public goods and a debate over how to take public goods into account, if
at all, when deciding how to enforce rights.239 Also oversimplified, the latter
distrusts large organizations and views the law’s fundamental concern as attending

procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely
from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
234
See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
235
See Sternlight, supra note 59, at 688–93.
236
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 7 (2006) (“A consumer who is forced to arbitrate a dispute without having
knowledgably consented to arbitration loses both the freedom to use the court system and
the freedom to contract in a knowing fashion.”).
237
See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 962–69 (1999) (“The problem with
understanding the FAA cases as primarily about enforcing private agreements to arbitrate is
that, in many recent cases, courts have applied attenuated notions of consent, compelling
arbitration when consent is thin, if not outright fictitious.”). Paternalism is one common
argument against the unconscionability doctrine. But it is not paternalistic because courts
have an interest in refusing to put their stamp of approval on agreements that are “harmful,
exploitative, or immoral.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 224 (2000).
238
See supra Part III.
239
See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 184–
95 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM] (describing political liberalism).
Generally, liberalism insists on fair procedures and respect for individual rights. MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 7–8 (1996).
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the needs of the vulnerable.240 For the purposes of this Article, I use “liberalism” to
mean reform advocates’ attempts to protect consumers, employees, franchisees,
and others from large (or more powerful) organizations by eliminating mandatory
arbitration—a form of legal liberalism. But because political liberalism and legal
liberalism often overlap, I address their actions from a political-liberalism
perspective as well, principally because the reform advocates want to protect
individual rights without accounting for any public good that mandatory arbitration
may create.241 In doing so, I show that the reform advocates’ attempts to eliminate
mandatory arbitration are premature. Regulating, rather than eliminating,
mandatory arbitration as an alternative method for resolving disputes is the best
course of action—at least for now.
Most of the reform advocates’ criticisms of mandatory arbitration focus on
how it affects individual rights, including the right to a fair hearing, the right to a
transparent decision-making process, and the right to make autonomous
decisions.242 They believe arbitration should be governed by principles that
promote these rights and that these rights cannot be sacrificed for the public
good.243 In other words, they believe these rights trump considerations of what
might be best for the public at large.244 However, the reform advocates’ criticisms
ignore mandatory arbitration’s larger effect on society—specifically, its potential
effect on the public good.245 Although this is a common criticism of liberalism

240

William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 135 (2004). Professor Simon
explains that legal liberalism is based on three background premises (the victim
perspective, populism, and the priority of rights) and three strategic premises (a preference
for controlling information, choosing between rules and standards, and structuring
procedure). Id. at 133.
241
Legal liberalism and political liberalism have been linked since the Warren Court.
See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996).
242
See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., § 2 (2009)
(listing the bill’s Congressional “findings”).
243
See generally STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS
42 (1992) (stating that liberalism asserts that “the rights of individual citizens cannot be
sacrificed for the sake of other goods or goals”); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note, 239, at
185 (explaining that, according to political liberalism, “individual rights . . . outweigh . . .
consideration of the common good”).
244
See id.
245
The reform advocates do, sometimes, reference negative effects that mandatory
arbitration has on the public. For example, the Congressional “findings” in the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009 state that mandatory arbitration “undermines the development of
public law for civil rights and consumer rights.” See H.R. 1020 § 2. But they neglect any
positive contributions that mandatory arbitration has made. To be clear, I’m not saying that
mandatory arbitration is a public good or that its benefits outweigh its costs. I honestly
don’t know for certain whether such statements are true. And I’m not sure that anyone else
does either. Also, I’m not advocating that the question can be fully answered by a costbenefit analysis. All I’m saying is that we somehow need to take mandatory arbitration’s
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generally,246 and although this general criticism can be rebutted,247 it has particular
merit in the mandatory-arbitration context for three reasons.
First, mandatory arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon. It emerged only
over the last twenty-five years, which means that courts and policy makers have
not had a great deal of time to study its use.248 In fact, empirical data related to its
use is limited, so the question of whether mandatory arbitration is a public good is
difficult to answer.249 Accordingly, we should continue to study its use to
determine its overall effect on society (while taking steps to improve its fairness).
But the reform advocates prefer to ignore mandatory arbitration’s potential benefits
and focus instead on recognizing consumers’, employees’, and franchisees’
“rights.”250 In particular, they disregard mandatory arbitration’s tendency to reduce
judicial caseloads and lower companies’ dispute-resolution costs, while
concentrating on their right to a fair hearing and their right to make autonomous
decisions.251 Ignoring these factors is a short-sighted approach. Mandatory
arbitration is too new, and the laws surrounding it have changed too fast, to say
with absolute certainty that it should be eliminated at this point.252
This leads to the second criticism of the reform advocates’ liberal position.
Reform advocates would likely respond that their rights should be considered prior
to and separate from the public good, and that their rights should therefore

effect on the public good into account. I believe adopting a more pragmatic approach to
mandatory arbitration can help achieve this goal.
246
See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM, at xii–xiii, 6 (1993).
247
See id. at 198–200.
248
Sternlight, supra note 216, at 1631–32 (“The involuntary imposition of arbitration
in lieu of open court procedures is a new and most controversial phenomenon.”).
249
Id. at 1634 (“Although the question of whether mandatory arbitration positively or
negatively impacts most individuals has been widely debated among academics and
practitioners, empirical data is scant and not likely to resolve this question in the near
future.”). For competing empirical studies, compare O’DONNELL, supra note 11, with
Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What
the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009).
250
Simon, supra note 240, at 148 (stating that legal liberalism has “a Utopian
tendency to ignore the costs of the recognition of entitlements”).
251
Take, for example, the Congressional “findings” in the Arbitration Fairness Acts
of 2007 and 2009. Neither set of findings mentions mandatory arbitration’s tendency to
reduce judicial caseloads and lower companies’ dispute resolution costs. Instead, both
focus on mandatory arbitration’s negative effects. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007).
252
To be clear, I agree that the current mandatory-arbitration framework is not
entirely fair and that it needs to be changed. All I’m saying here is that it’s too soon to
eliminate mandatory arbitration because we don’t yet know enough about it. See Simon,
supra note 240, at 177–78 (“The Pragmatist objects to the liberal idea of rights
enforcement as the elaboration of a pre-existing moral consensus. She sides with the Legal
Realist in insisting that whatever normative consensus exists in the society is too
incomplete and ambiguous to play the role Legal Liberalism expects.”).
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prevail.253 But the validity of their rights-oriented claims is sometimes debatable.
For instance, Stephen Ware argues that mandatory arbitration does not interfere
with autonomy.254 Specifically, he disputes the reform advocates’ claim that
individuals should not be forced to arbitrate unless they “knowingly” consented to
an arbitration agreement, stating that arbitration law does not apply “subjective
knowing-consent standards.”255 Also, Bo Rutledge disputes all of the congressional
“findings” that appear in the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2007 and 2009.256 He
says the findings—which lay out the individual rights that are lost through
mandatory arbitration—are based on underdeveloped normative and empirical
claims and that arbitration has improved the average individual’s access to
justice.257 Rutledge’s and Ware’s opinions on these topics are well-stated, and they
are not espousing fringe views. In other words, at least some of the reform
advocates “rights” are debatable, which reduces the validity of their rightsoriented, liberal position.
Finally, the reform advocates assert that the judiciary is more capable of
protecting individual rights—even though the judiciary isn’t perfect in this
regard258—and most fail to consider whether regulating arbitration could make it a
more rights-oriented process.259 In fact, the majority of bills submitted to Congress
over the last fifteen years called for eliminating mandatory arbitration, thereby
implicitly assuming that the court system will protect individual rights lost in
arbitration.260 Also, the few bills that did suggest regulating mandatory
arbitration—thus attempting to improve its fairness for individuals subjected to
it—received little congressional support.261 In other words, the reform advocates
253

See SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note, 239, at 185.
BRUNET ET AL., supra note 236, at 335 (“[T]he value of autonomy requires that
people be bound by agreements they formed even when they did not know or understand,
in any meaningful way, what they were agreeing to.”).
255
Id. at 334–35; see also Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional
Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 195, 201 (1998) (“There is no duress in the typical ‘adhesion’ contract. A consumer
who contracts in such circumstances does so voluntarily.”).
256
Rutledge, supra note 206, at 268–79.
257
Id. at 277 (“In sum, the findings that underpin the most radical overhaul of federal
arbitration law in over eighty years are scientifically unproven, normatively debatable or
demonstrably wrong.”).
258
Simon, supra note 240, at 180 (“The American judiciary appears to be doing a
very poor job of enforcing a broad range of rights.”).
259
Very few bills actually suggested changes to current arbitration laws to make the
process fairer for individuals subjected to mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Fair Arbitration
Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026,
107th Cong. § 2 (2002); Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210,
106th Cong. § 2 (2000).
260
See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931 111th Cong. § 2 (2009);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
261
For example, the three bills introduced by Senator Jeff Sessions, which proposed
certain regulations for the mandatory-arbitration process, had no co-sponsors. Bill
254
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have been fixated on eliminating, rather than regulating, mandatory arbitration,
even if it means being subjected to a court system that has its own issues with
protecting individual rights.
In sum, the reform advocates’ liberal position is too rigid. They want to
eliminate a relatively new process without fully studying its effects; they describe
debatable rights as being absolute; and they refuse to concede that arbitration can
be, with some changes, a more rights-oriented process. Instead of this rigid
position, reform advocates should adopt a more pragmatic approach to mandatory
arbitration, one that focuses on regulating, rather than eliminating, the process.
Regulating mandatory arbitration would increase fairness for the parties subjected
to it while allowing everyone to study it over time to determine its overall effect on
the public good.
C. Proposing a Goal-Oriented, Pragmatic Approach
So far I’ve examined the problems with the Supreme Court’s arbitration
formalism, including the resulting increase in mandatory arbitration, and the limits
of the reform advocates’ liberal response, including its rigidity. Now I want to
propose an alternative approach for dealing with mandatory arbitration, one that
continues its use while improving its overall fairness through legislative or agency
regulation. In doing so, I hope to show that regulating mandatory arbitration is
consistent with pragmatic principles and that a goal-oriented version of
pragmatism is superior to formalism and liberalism in this context.
The goal-oriented version of pragmatism I propose considers consequences; it
is anti-dogmatic; it acknowledges that other perspectives exist; and it values
experimentation.262 In that sense, it is consistent with the everyday use of the word
“pragmatic”263 because it focuses on figuring out what works and finding solutions
Summary & Status, 110th Congress (2007–2008) S. 1135, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:s1135: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Bill
Summary
&
Status,
107th
Congress
(2001–2002)
S.
3026,
LIBR.
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s3026: (last visited Nov. 13,
2011); Bill Summary & Status, 106th Congress (1999–2000) S. 3210, LIBR. CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:s3210: (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
262
See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 706, 734, 738. The description that I give
here of pragmatism is pieced together from several sources. These sources show there are
three basic types: philosophical, legal, and everyday. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 49–56 (2003) (explaining everyday pragmatism); Thomas
C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 21 (1996) (discussing
legal pragmatism and philosophical pragmatism and stating that the former should stand
free from the latter). I borrow mostly from descriptions of legal pragmatism and everyday
pragmatism, and the goal-oriented pragmatism I propose is similar to the “radical
pragmatism” described by Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 691–92.
263
See POSNER, supra note 262, at 49–50 (describing everyday pragmatism as “the
mindset denoted by the popular usage of the word ‘pragmatic’”); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227 (1999) [hereinafter
POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY] (“I am interested in pragmatism as a disposition to
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to problems.264 It also rejects the formalist idea that law is grounded in permanent,
immutable principles and the liberal idea that rights enforcement is the elaboration
of a moral consensus.265
For example, both the Supreme Court’s arbitration formalism and the reform
advocates’ arbitration liberalism are too absolute. The former mechanically
enforces arbitration agreements based on flawed deductive reasoning, allowing
companies to mandate arbitration with individuals on terms that aren’t always
fair.266 The latter characterizes sometimes-debatable rights as indisputable and
demands mandatory arbitration’s elimination, disregarding any public benefits that
mandatory arbitration may have.267
Pragmatism, on the other hand, recognizes that we cannot analytically derive
solutions to problems like mandatory arbitration and that any existing moral
consensus regarding the rights lost in mandatory arbitration is too ambiguous to
play the role that the reform advocates expect.268 It is a more circumspect, flexible
doctrine. In fact, it recognizes that the less certainty we have regarding problems
like mandatory arbitration, the more incentive we have to experiment.269
To say that pragmatism is flexible and that it values experimentation,
however, does not mean that it has to be value-neutral, which is one of the most
frequent criticisms against pragmatism generally.270 To avoid this general
criticism, I propose a goal-oriented version of pragmatism that seeks to improve
ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms and
generalities.”). I recognize that Posner discusses pragmatism mostly in the context of
judicial decision-making, and that he would disagree with some, if not much, of what I
propose, but I like his basic definition of pragmatism, so I am hijacking parts of it and
applying it in the context of regulating mandatory arbitration.
264
See POSNER, supra note 262, at 50 (stating that pragmatism is an “attitude that
predisposes Americans to judge proposals by the criterion of what works”); see also
Simon, supra note 240, at 177 (“Pragmatist practice is problem solving.”).
265
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995); Simon, supra note 240, at
177; see also Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 424 (1990)
(stating that pragmatism “expresses a deep distrust for” formalism).
266
See supra Part III.
267
See supra Part IV.
268
See Simon, supra note 240, at 177–78.
269
See POSNER, MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 263, at 248 (“The less one
thinks one knows the answers to difficult questions of policy, the more inclined one will be
to encourage learning about them through experimentation and other methods of inquiry.”);
see also Simon, supra note 240, at 177 (stating that solutions to public problems “are best
derived deliberatively and experimentally”); Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 704
(“Pragmatists are committed to finding substantive sustenance for their guiding ideals
through experiential inquiry.”). Some of the experiments might include expanding the
review of awards, letting parties choose to have small claims courts handle certain matters,
and prohibiting waivers of injunctive relief, consequential damages, or punitive damages,
to name a few.
270
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 41 (1997) (stating that
the core problem with pragmatism is “its substantive emptiness”).
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mandatory arbitration’s overall fairness through regulation.271 Stated differently,
the pragmatism I propose says something about the ends we should pursue in
mandatory arbitration.272 It attempts to resolve the conflict between companies that
wish to mandate arbitration, on the one hand, and individuals that wish to avoid it,
on the other, by continuing, but regulating, mandatory-arbitration’s use. In that
sense, my proposal recognizes the changes that have occurred in arbitration over
the last twenty-five years, but it also recognizes that Congress wanted to protect
individuals from abusive practices when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act in
1925.273 Thus, it is a middle-ground approach that takes arbitration’s history into
account while recognizing the potential benefits of its current and future use.274
This approach will allow us to study mandatory arbitration before deciding
whether to eliminate it entirely.275 Empirical study, in fact, is one of the key
principles276 of the pragmatic approach I propose because the existing empirical
data on mandatory arbitration is limited.277 It would be helpful to know more about
how much money mandatory arbitration saves companies, the extent to which
those companies pass savings along to consumers, and how much it really reduces
judicial caseloads, to name a few potential benefits.278 It would also be helpful to

271

I borrowed the idea that pragmatism need not be value-neutral from Sullivan &
Solove, supra note 13, at 703 (“The pragmatist justifies her value commitments, in part, by
analyzing their historical genesis.”).
272
See id. at 703–04.
273
See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 14–15 (statements of Sen. Thomas
Sterling, Chairman, Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary and Julius H. Cohen,
General Counsel, N.Y. Chamber of Commerce); 1923 Hearings, supra note 14, at 9–10
(statements of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh and W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, Comm. of Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law, American Bar Ass’s).
274
Thus, the pragmatism I propose is not ahistorical. It recognizes that we must look
at arbitration’s history to determine what fairness and justice mean in the mandatoryarbitration context. See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 703–04 (“The pragmatist
justifies her value commitments, in part, by analyzing their historical genesis. Guiding
ideals such as ‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘freedom’ must be critically examined by looking to
past experience.”).
275
In other words, the pragmatism I propose is not a universalist prescription, but a
suggestion for an approach that should be helpful given the political and legal climate
surrounding mandatory arbitration. See Daria Roithmayr, “Easy for You to Say”: An Essay
on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV.
939, 948 (2003). Other approaches may work better when that climate changes.
276
It is one of the key principles of pragmatism generally. See POSNER, supra note
265, at 11 (listing “empirical” as one of the adjectives Posner uses to describe pragmatism);
Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century,
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 188 (stating that Brandeis “would have wanted a full view of the
facts before making up his mind about possible remedies” and that “much can be learned
from a more empirical approach”).
277
Sternlight, supra note 216, at 1634 (explaining existing empirical data is “scant”).
278
Empirical data could help resolve some ongoing disagreements over these issues.
For example, Jean Sternlight and Stephen Ware disagree over the extent to which
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continue studying mandatory arbitration’s affect on individual rights given that the
end goal is to improve mandatory arbitration’s procedural fairness. This “critical
assessment of our ends” will allow us to re-examine, among other things, where
those ends came from, what they were responding to, and what type of results they
have had on parties involved with mandatory arbitration.279
In sum, adopting a pragmatic, regulatory approach would allow us to fill
empirical gaps and continue examining our “end” goal of improving mandatory
arbitration’s procedural fairness. This approach will no doubt be imperfect, but the
mandatory-arbitration system we have now certainly is not ideal.280 Besides, if
companies dislike the regulations adopted under this approach, they can always
make an economic decision to remove mandatory-arbitration provisions from their
contracts or to lobby the regulatory body for change. And, although the approach I
propose is unquestionably better than what is currently available, individuals can
lobby for change if they believe the new regulations don’t go far enough.281 In the
end, this approach seeks to balance companies’ needs against individuals’ rights,
hopefully in a manner that ultimately improves the overall public good.
D. Specific Regulations to Consider
If a pragmatic, regulatory approach is the best approach for dealing with the
mandatory arbitration problem, then the remaining task is to figure out what
regulations to adopt. I propose five here: (1) an opt-out for small claims; (2) a new
disclosure standard for arbitrators and arbitration providers aimed at reducing the
repeat-player bias and increasing nondrafting parties’ control over the dispute
resolution process; (3) a data-collection requirement for arbitration providers; (4) a
companies pass along cost-savings to consumers. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 236, at
329 n.68 (pointing out the lack of empirical data to support either side of the argument).
279
See Sullivan & Solove, supra note 13, at 704–05. A regulatory approach can
encourage these questions. Consider, for example, the Dodd-Frank bill that Congress
passed in 2010. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill says that the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau
must “conduct a study of, and shall provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and
consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or
services.” Id. § 1028. Hopefully the CPFB will take time to study and experiment (through
regulation) with mandatory arbitration before deciding whether it should be eliminated
(which the CPFB has the authority to do for disputes covered under the bill).
280
The Supreme Court has taken us too far in one direction, and the reform advocates
want to overcorrect in the other. See supra Parts I, II.
281
Presumably this would occur through the same organizations that have been
lobbying Congress for reform over the last fifteen years. According to Professor Simon,
this type of associative democracy is one of the background principles of legal pragmatism.
Simon, supra note 240, at 173, 175 (stating that associative democracy “is the idea that
citizens should participate in the design and implementation of the policies that affect
them” and that citizens’ “participation can take a variety of forms, but there is special
emphasis on participation through nongovernmental organizations”).
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prohibition on class-action waivers, substantively unconscionable forum-selection
clauses, shorter statutes of limitations, and waivers of injunctive relief,
consequential damages, or punitive damages; and (5) a slight expansion of the
available judicial review. These are not comprehensive, by any means, but they are
at the very least a good starting point for addressing some of the most glaring
problems in the current mandatory-arbitration system.
1. Opt-Out for Small Claims
First, consumers, employees, and franchisees should be able to opt-out of
arbitration and have their claims heard in small claims court if their claims fall
below the applicable court’s jurisdictional limit.282 Small claims courts generally
are faster and less-expensive venues for resolving disputes.283 And they can be
even less formal than arbitration, as parties often forego hiring an attorney and
represent themselves.284 But those attributes are not the reason for providing the
opt-out. The reason for providing the opt-out is that it will make the disputeresolution process seem fairer for the parties being subjected to it. They may weigh
their options and proceed in the forum most suited to their claims, no longer being
forced into a specific forum.285 By providing this option, the opt-out will enhance
the process’s procedural justice because it will enhance parties’ control over the
procedures used to resolve their disputes.286
282

The limit varies from state to state. See MARGARET C. JASPER, SMALL CLAIMS
COURTS 39–40 (attaching an appendix showing the jurisdictional limits for each state as of
2005). The American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides this option in its
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes. See, Supplementary
Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes, AM. ARB. ASS’N, at r. C-1(d),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). The AAA provision
obviously allows parties to opt out of arbitration even after the opposing party has filed the
arbitration claim, an idea I support so long as the opt-out is made before the respondent’s
answering statement is due under the applicable rules. Finally, Professor Blankley pointed
out in her comments on this paper that “many” businesses already provide this option.
283
JASPER, supra note 282, at vii, 22; Bruce Zucker & Monica Herr, The People’s
Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37
U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 315–20 (2003).
284
JASPER, supra note 282, at 2. Small claims courts have drawbacks as well. For
example, they generally don’t allow losing plaintiffs to appeal. Id. at 22.
285
The regulation should require drafting parties to reference the opt-out right in the
arbitration provision and include a warning that the nondrafting parties should research the
procedures of both arbitration and small claims court before deciding where to have their
claims heard. The Consumer Due Process Protocol calls for the former, but not the latter.
See Consumer Due Process Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N, at princs. 5, 11,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
286
See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute
Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 63, 68–71 (2008) (discussing the importance of control in procedural justice). By
increasing control, the opt-out will increase parties’ perceptions of how fair the process
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2. New Disclosure Standard
Second, potential arbitrators should have to disclose to the nondrafting party
basic information about the arbitrators’ prior five cases287 and arbitration providers
should have to disclose the same information about the drafting party’s previous
arbitrations before the provider.288 That information should include the following:









a very brief description of each case;
the prevailing party (without disclosing the party’s identity, unless
that party is a party to the current case);
the relief awarded (if any);
the time elapsed between the claim statement and the ultimate award,
settlement, or other disposition;
a copy of the written award (if any) with the parties’ identities
redacted (except for the identities of parties to the current case);
a brief explanation of the type of hearing held (telephone, in-person,
or a decision based on paper submissions);
whether the case was an “appeal” from the drafting party’s internal
dispute-resolution system;
and the amount of arbitrator fees ultimately assigned to the
nondrafting party.289

is—which enhances the process’s procedural justice. Although procedural justice doesn’t
focus solely on parties’ subjective beliefs, subjective beliefs are a significant part of the
procedural justice equation. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66 (1988) (“A number of studies have found
evidence of either direct or indirect enhancement of evaluations of legal outcomes when
procedures are viewed as fair.”).
287
The potential arbitrators should have to disclose this information for all cases
involving the drafting party in the current case (i.e., not limited to the previous five cases).
288
See generally ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009, at 10 (2009) (recommending that “[a]ll arbitrator
decisions involving a ‘repeat participant’ must be available upon request to all participants
in a subsequent arbitration involving the repeat participant, but that information must be
disclosed in such a manner that protects the privacy rights of the non-repeat participants in
the prior arbitration.”); Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 285, at princ. 3
(suggesting that parties should be provided with the names and contact information of the
party representatives in each arbitrator’s last six arbitrations); Employment Due Process
Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N, at B(3), C(4), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535 (last visited
Jan. 19, 2011). I prefer the objective information I call for over the party-representative
contact information—called for in the Consumer and Employment Due Process Protocols.
First, it will be difficult and time consuming to contact those parties and have them agree to
discuss the proceedings. Second, their opinions may be colored by the outcome of the
proceedings. Third, the quality of the information received from them will depend on their
ability and willingness to communicate about the proceedings.
289
For the arbitration provider, I would also require the names of the arbitrators in the
drafting party’s previous cases. California requires arbitration providers to collect and
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Requiring these disclosures will give nondrafting parties additional control over
the arbitrator selection process and more information when deciding whether to
settle disputes in arbitration or in small claims court (assuming small claims court
is an option). It also may reduce the repeat-player bias by helping nondrafting
parties avoid arbitrators who potentially exhibit that bias.290 Thus, this measure
will enhance nondrafting parties’ control and their perceptions of the process’s
overall fairness.291
3. Data-collection Requirement
Third, arbitration providers should have to collect and organize the case
information referenced in the previous paragraph, not only so that they can
disclose it to the nondrafting party in each case, but also so that they can aggregate
it and make it publicly available for additional empirical research. While the fate of
mandatory arbitration should not hinge on these empirical studies—because
empirical research may not be able to definitively prove whether mandatory
arbitration is fair or unfair to nondrafting parties292—these studies do inform the
debate on whether and how to continue modifying the process.293 Take Professor
Lisa Bingham’s studies from the 1990s.294 These were the first studies to

publicly disclose this, and some of the other information referenced above, under its civil
procedure code. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2010). Additionally, I would
require the arbitration provider to disclose any complaints filed against the potential
arbitrators.
290
Repeat-player employers appear to have an advantage in arbitration, but there is
some question over whether that advantage comes from arbitrators favoring repeat players.
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 427–32 (2007) (explaining that
repeat-player employers fare better in arbitration than one-shot participants, but that
multiple possible explanations exist for this phenomenon). Regardless, this disclosure
requirement will reduce the importance of any such bias, because nondrafting parties will
have a better chance of avoiding arbitrators who might exhibit it, thereby enhancing
nondrafting parties’ perceptions of the process’s fairness.
291
This disclosure requirement assumes the parties will be using the list selection
method with each party having limited peremptory strikes and unlimited challenges for
cause. Only if the parties are unable to select an arbitrator, or a panel of arbitrators, through
this method should the arbitration provider complete the selection process.
292
David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1336 (2009).
293
See Karen A. Jordan, Empirical Studies of Judicial Decisions Serve an Important
Role in the Cumulative Process of Policy Making, 31 IND. L. REV. 81, 88 (1998)
(explaining how empirical studies help shape healthcare policy and stating that:
“[E]mpirical research is, by nature, progressive. Each study yields discrete pieces of
information relevant to overarching policy concerns.”).
294
See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223 (1998).
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empirically show evidence of the repeat-player bias,295 and they undoubtedly have
helped prompt calls for reform. Additional studies based on information gathered
after any new regulations are enacted could have the same effect, or could show
that the regulations are improving the process’s fairness to nondrafting parties.
Either way, they will allow us to continue monitoring mandatory-arbitration
outcomes from a larger sample size and compare those outcomes to the outcomes
for similar cases in litigation.296
4. Certain Prohibitions
Fourth, drafting parties should not be able to include class-action waivers,
substantively unconscionable forum-selection clauses, shorter statutes of
limitations, or restrictions on injunctive relief, consequential damages, or punitive
damages in their agreements.297 The purposes of these types of provisions,
obviously, are to limit the remedies available in arbitration and to make
nondrafting parties’ claims more difficult to assert. They create economic
disincentives to bringing claims, thereby increasing drafting parties’ chances of
escaping liability.298 The major problem with this in mandatory arbitration, of
course, is that the nondrafting parties have little to no ability to bargain over these
terms, which reduces the process’s perceived and substantive fairness. Enacting
these prohibitions will ensure that the remedies in arbitration are more comparable
to the remedies in litigation and that drafting parties face similar liability risks in
each forum.299
295

Colvin, supra note 290, at 427.
Id. at 406 (noting that this is one of the critical issues in empirical research in
employment arbitration); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in
Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 405 (2008) (“Regarding the key matter of
quality, arbitration proponents proceed on the essentially unchallenged assumption that
arbitration results are of at least equivalent quality as litigation results. The assumption
should be scrutinized and tested empirically.”).
297
See Stempel, supra note 296, at 413–15, 421.
298
See id.; see also ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 288, at 13, 65
(calling for a ban on class-action waivers and stating that they fail to promote efficiency,
lead to inconsistent decisions, discourage parties from filing claims, and remove public
scrutiny of illegal practices); Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at
Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interests, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 165, 188 (2005) (listing class action waivers and shorter statutes of
limitations as two of the problems that still need to be addressed).
299
The Consumer Due Process Protocol addresses forum-selection clauses and the
availability of remedies such as punitive damages. For the former, it says that parties
should agree on a “reasonably convenient” location and that if they cannot agree on such a
location then the provider should select the location for them. See Consumer Due Process
Protocol, supra note 285, at princ. 7, reporter’s cmts. I support this rule, but I would also
give the provider explicit authority to require telephone or online arbitration if the
arbitrator finds (after the parties fail to reach an agreement on location) that form of
arbitration appropriate under the circumstances. As to clauses that limit remedies, the
296
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5. Expansion of Judicial Review
Finally, we should expand judicial review of arbitration awards for
nondrafting parties under the manifest-disregard standard.300 Specifically,
arbitrators should be required to issue written awards in mandatory arbitrations,
and nondrafting parties should be able to challenge those awards for legal error.301
While this change would make arbitration more expensive, the benefits of
expanded review in this context outweigh its costs.302 In particular, expanding the
manifest-disregard standard in this way would give nondrafting parties greater
outcome control.303 They would finally have a viable way to correct arbitrators’
mistakes, thus making the process fairer and enhancing its procedural justice.304
Overall, these regulations increase nondrafting parties’ options, give them
additional information about the arbitration process, and provide safeguards
against drafting parties’ overreaching. They may increase arbitration’s costs, and
some of them may be ineffective, but the need to improve mandatory arbitration’s
fairness overrides these concerns, and the benefit to regulating mandatory
arbitration—instead of eliminating it—is that we can experiment with regulations
until we figure out what, exactly, works. In any event, these regulations should at

Consumer Due Process Protocol says that arbitrators should “have broad authority to
fashion relief appropriate to the circumstances” and that such authority “is limited only by
the agreement of the parties and the scope of submission to arbitration.” Id. at princ. 14,
reporter’s cmts. Thus, it says that arbitrators should respect contractual waivers of relief.
This is problematic in mandatory arbitration because the nondrafting party cannot bargain
over these types of terms. I do not believe, therefore, that we should allow such terms to
stand. See Stempel, supra note 296, at 413, 437; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 33–36 (1997)
(arguing that waivers of punitive damages are against public policy).
300
See Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural Justice of
Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47, 75–82 (2010) (calling for an expansion of this standard
of review).
301
Reasoned opinions would increase arbitration’s costs, but they would also make it
easier to determine if an arbitrator actually disregarded the law, which is difficult to
determine under the current standard applied by most courts. Id. at 62–63, 81–82. This
expanded-review proposal would still work without the reasoned-opinion requirement. But
it would be less efficient and less likely to result in vacated awards. Id. at 82 n.230.
302
Id. at 75–82. One way to stem those costs would be to explicitly make sanctions
available for frivolous appeals—using an objective, not subjective standard. This should
reduce the number of pro forma appeals. Id. at 79–80.
303
See id. at 76.
304
Id. at 82; see also Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three
Processes Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation and
Arbitration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167, 1167 (1993) (discussing the
importance of control in procedural justice); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of
Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 546 (1978) (“The distribution of control among the
procedural group participants is the most significant factor in characterizing a procedural
system.”).
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the very least be a good starting point for addressing some of the more glaring
problems with the current mandatory-arbitration system and they should, if
enacted, reduce calls for mandatory arbitration’s elimination, thus preserving it as
an alternative method of resolving disputes for drafting parties while making it
fairer for the nondrafting parties subjected to it.
V. CONCLUSION
Both the Supreme Court’s arbitration formalism and the reform advocates’
arbitration liberalism are too rigid. One relies on flawed, deductive reasoning to
mechanically enforce arbitration agreements; the other demands mandatory
arbitration’s elimination without considering reforms that could make it a more
rights-oriented process. A pragmatic, regulatory approach, on the other hand,
values experimentation and study and has an end goal of improving mandatory
arbitration’s overall fairness. Given the positive effect that mandatory arbitration
can (possibly) have on the public good, this approach is the best way to resolve the
current discord surrounding mandatory arbitration because it balances companies’
needs against individuals’ rights.
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VI. APPENDIX
Bill Name
Federal Fair Franchise
Practices Act, H.R. 1717,
104th Cong. (1995)

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1995,
S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995).

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1996,
H.R. 3748, 104th Cong.
(1996)

Fairness and Voluntary
Arbitration Act of 1996,
H.R. 3422, 104th Cong.
(1996).

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1996,
H.R. 983, 105th Cong.
305

Relevant Purpose of Bill
Section 9 of the bill would
have precluded franchisors
from “exclud[ing] collective
action by franchisees to
settle like disputes arising
from violation of this Act
either by civil action or
arbitration.”
To “amend certain Federal
civil rights statutes to
prevent the involuntary
application of arbitration to
claims that arise from
unlawful employment
discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or
disability, and for other
purposes.”305
Same as other CRPPA
bill.306

To “amend chapter 1 of title
9 of the United States Code
to permit each party to
certain contracts to accept or
reject arbitration as a means
of settling disputes under the
contracts.”
Same as prior CRPPA bills.

Final Bill Status
Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to Committee on
Labor and Human
Resources.

Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Constitution, and (2)
Economic and Educational
Opportunities Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.

Referred to (1) Education
and the Workforce
Committee’s

Specifically, the bill applied to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, the equal pay requirement under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. See Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1995, S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995).
306
By saying that this bill has the same purpose as the previous one introduced, I am
not saying that the bill is completely unchanged. There may be some amendments to it
from the previous version. For our purposes, I’m simply focusing on the overall purpose of
the bill as it relates to arbitration.

1356

UTAH LAW REVIEW

Bill Name
(1997).

Relevant Purpose of Bill

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1997,
S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997).
Federal Fair Franchise
Practices Act of 1997,
H.R. 2954, 105th Cong.
(1997).
Fairness and Voluntary
Arbitration Act of 1998,
H.R. 2882, 105th Cong.
(1998).
Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration
Fairness Act of 1998,
S. 2434, 105th Cong.
(1998).

Same as prior CRPPA bills.

Small Business Franchise
Act of 1998, H.R. 4841,
105th Cong. (1998).

Small Business Franchise
Act of 1999, H.R. 3308,
106th Cong. (1999).
A Bill to Amend Title 9,
United States Code, to
Allow Employees the Right
307

Same as prior FFFPA bill.

Same as prior FVAA bill.

To “amend chapter 1 of title
9, United States Code, to
provide for greater fairness
in the arbitration process
relating to motor vehicle
franchise contracts.”307
Section 6 would have
prohibited franchisors from
preventing franchisees,
either in court or in
arbitration, “from
participating as a member of
a class permitted by Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or applicable
State law.”
Same as prior SBFA bill.

The title is pretty selfexplanatory. Section 1
would have allowed both

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Subcommittees on (a)
Employer-Employee
Relations, (b) Workforce
Protections, and (c)
Postsecondary Education,
Training and Life-Long
Learning; and (2) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on the Constitution.
Referred to Committee on
Labor and Human
Resources.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Oversight and Courts.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and

The bill would have allowed parties to opt out of arbitration and, if parties chose to
proceed with arbitration, it would have required the arbitrator to issue a written award.
Motor Vehicle Franchise Control Arbitration Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2434, 105th Cong. §
2(a) (1998).

2011]

REGULATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION

Bill Name
to Accept or Reject the Use
of Arbitration to Resolve an
Employment Controversy,
H.R. 613, 106th Cong.
(1999).
Consumer Fairness Act of
1999, H.R. 2258,
106th Cong. (1999).

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1999,
H.R. 872, 106th Cong.
(1999).

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1999,
S. 121, 106th Cong. (1999).
Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration
Fairness Act of 1999, S.
1020, 106th Cong. (1999).
Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2000, H.R.
534, 106th Cong. (2000).
Anti-Predatory Lending Act
of 2000, H.R. 3901,
106th Cong. (2000).308

Predatory Lending
Deterrence Act, S. 2405,
308
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Relevant Purpose of Bill
parties to choose whether to
arbitrate after the dispute
arose.

Final Bill Status
Administrative Law.

To “treat arbitration clauses
which are unilaterally
imposed on consumers as an
unfair and deceptive trade
practice and prohibit their
use in consumer
transactions.”
Same as prior CRPPA bills.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.

Same as prior CRPPA bills.

Same as prior MVFCAFA
bill.

Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on the Constitution; and (2)
Committee on Education
and the Workforce’s
Subcommittees on (a)
Employer-Employee
Relations, (b) Workforce
Protections, and (c)
Postsecondary Education,
Training and Life-Long
Learning.
Referred to Committee on
Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Same as prior MVFCAFA
bills.

Passed the House.

Section 3(j) would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit
mandatory arbitration
provisions in high cost
mortgages.
Section 4(j) would have
amended the Truth in

Referred to Banking and
Financial Services
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.
Referred to Committee on
Banking, Housing, and

This bill, and the multiple other bills like it that were introduced in subsequent
years, may have been prompted by a HUD investigation and report on predatory lending
practices. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 98–99 (2000).

1358
Bill Name
106th Cong. (2000).

Consumer Credit Fair
Dispute Resolution Act of
2000, S. 2117, 106th Cong.
(2000).
Consumer and Employee
Arbitration Bill of Rights,
S. 3210, 106th Cong.
(2000).

Financial Consumers Bill of
Rights Act, H.R. 4332,
106th Cong. (2000).

American Homebuyer’s
Protection Act, H.R. 5033,
106th Cong. (2000).

309
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Relevant Purpose of Bill
Lending Act to prohibit
mandatory arbitration in
mortgage agreements
covered by Section 103(aa).
To “amend title 9, United
States Code, with respect to
consumer credit
transactions.”309
To “amend chapter 1 of title
9, United States Code, to
provide for greater fairness
in the arbitration process for
consumers and
employees.”310
Section 8 of the bill would
have prohibited pre-dispute
arbitration provisions in
“any consumer transaction
or consumer contract.”

To “prohibit offering
homebuilding purchase
contracts that contain in a
single document both a
mandatory arbitration
agreement and other contract
provisions and to prohibit
requiring purchasers to
consent to a mandatory
arbitration agreement as a

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Urban Affairs.

Referred to the Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to the Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to (1) Banking and
Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit, and (2) Commerce
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Finance and Hazardous
Materials.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Housing and Community
Opportunity.

Specifically, Section 2 of the bill would have precluded parties from including
arbitration provisions in consumer credit agreements. However, it would have allowed
parties to agree to arbitration after the dispute arose. See Consumer Credit Fair Dispute
Resolution Act of 2000, S. 2117, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (2000).
310
This bill would have required arbitration clauses to: (1) have their headings in
bold, capital letters; (2) state whether arbitration is mandatory or optional; (3) provide
contact information for a source where contracting parties can get more information on the
arbitration process; and (4) allow parties to have the option of resolving disputes under
$50,000 in small claims court. It also entitled parties to: (1) competent and neutral
arbitrators; (2) representation and a fair hearing; (3) present evidence, cross-examine
witnesses, and have a record of the proceedings; and (4) timely resolution and a written
award. See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S.3210, 106th Cong. §
2(b), (c) (2000). It is the same as the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th
Cong. (2002) and the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S.1135, 110th Cong. (2007). All three
were introduced by Jeff Sessions.

2011]

REGULATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION

Bill Name

American Homebuyer’s
Protection Act, H.R. 2053,
107th Cong. (2001).

Relevant Purpose of Bill
condition precedent to
entering into a homebuilding
purchase contract.”311
Same as prior AHPA bill.

A Bill to Amend Title 9,
United States Code, to
Allow Employees the Right
to Accept or Reject the Use
of Arbitration to Resolve an
Employment Controversy,
H.R. 815, 107th Cong.
(2001).
Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2001, S.
1140, 107th Cong. (2001).
Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2001, H.R.
1296, 107th Cong. (2001).
Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 2001,
H.R. 1489, 107th Cong.
(2001).

Same as the prior version of
the bill.

Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 2001, S.
163, 107th Cong. (2001).
Securing a Future for
Independent Agriculture
Act of 2001, S. 20, 107th

Same as prior CRPPA bills.

311

Same as prior MVFCAFA
bills.

Same as prior MVFCAFA
bills.

Same as prior CRPPA bills.

Section 128(b) would have
prohibited mandatory
arbitration of future disputes

1359

Final Bill Status

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Housing and Community
Opportunity.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.

House version (H.R. 1296)
passed the Senate and
House. Signed by President
Bush.312
Passed the Senate and
House. Signed by President
Bush.313
Referred to (1) Education
and the Workforce
Committee’s
Subcommittees on (a)
Employer-Employee
Relations, and (b)
Workforce Protections; and
(2) Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Constitution.
Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.
Referred to Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry.

This bill would have allowed homebuilders and their customers to arbitrate their
disputes, but only if the customers signed a separate contract agreeing to arbitration that is
not a condition precedent to the homebuilding contract. See American Homebuyer’s
Protection Act, H.R. 5033, 106th Cong. § 2(a), (b) (2000).
312
See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006).
313
Id.

1360
Bill Name
Cong. (2001).

Consumer Credit Fair
Dispute Resolution Act of
2001, S. 192, 107th Cong.
(2001).
Save Our Homes Act, H.R.
2531, 107th Cong. (2001).

Truth in Savings
Enhancement Act of 2001,
H.R. 1057, 107th Cong.
(2001).

Truth in Lending
Modernization Act of 2001,
H.R. 1054, 107th Cong.
(2001).

Protecting our Communities
from Predatory Lending
Practices Act, H.R. 3607,
107th Cong. (2001).

Predatory Lending
Consumer Protection Act of
2001, H.R. 1051, 107th
Cong. (2001).

Payday Borrower Protection
Act of 2001, H.R. 1319,
107th Cong. (2001).

UTAH LAW REVIEW
Relevant Purpose of Bill
between producers and
“covered persons or
contractors.”
Same as prior CCFDRA bill.

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status

Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Section 3(j) of the bill would
have amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit
lenders from including in
high cost mortgages a
“mandatory arbitration
clause [that] limits in any
way the right of the
borrower to seek relief
through the judicial
process.”
Section 3(d) of the bill
would have amended the
Truth in Savings Act to
prohibit depository
institutions from requiring
binding arbitration of
disputes with consumers.
Section 6(a) of the bill
would have amended the
Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit creditors from
requiring binding arbitration
of disputes with consumers.
Section 3(a) of the bill
would have amended the
Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit arbitration “in any
contract for the extension of
consumer credit secured by
the consumer’s dwelling.”

Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.

Section 4(g) of the bill
would have amended the
Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit arbitration
provisions in high-cost
mortgage contracts.
Section 4(b)(6)(h) would
have amended the Consumer
Credit Protection Act to

Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.

Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.

Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.

Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
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Bill Name

Preservation of Civil Rights
Protections Act of 2001,
H.R. 2282, 107th Cong.
(2001).

Preservation of Civil Rights
Protections Act of 2002, S.
2435, 107th Cong. (2002).
Genetically Engineered
Crop and Animal Farmer
Protection Act of 2002,
H.R. 4812, 107th Cong.
(2002).
INFORM Act of 2002, S.
2032, 107th Cong. (2002).

Employee Pension Freedom
Act of 2002, H.R. 3657,
107th Cong. (2002).

Relevant Purpose of Bill
prohibit arbitration
provisions in deferred
deposit loans.
To “amend title 9 of the
United States Code to
exclude all employment
contracts from the
arbitration provisions of
chapter 1 of such title . . . .”

Same as other PCRPA bill.

Section 4(b)(5) would have
prohibited mandatory
arbitration between biotech
companies and purchasers of
genetically engineered
plants, animals, or seeds.
Section 404 would have
amended ERISA to prohibit
pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses.
Section 404 would have
amended ERISA to prohibit
pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses.

Retirement Security
Protection Act of 2002, S.
1919, 107th Cong. (2002).

Section 405 would have
amended ERISA to prohibit
pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses.

Protecting America’s
Pensions Act of 2002, S.
1992, 107th Cong. (2002).

Section 306 would have
amended ERISA to prohibit
pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses.

Predatory Lending
Consumer Protection Act of
2002, S. 2438, 107th Cong.
(2002).

Same as prior PLCPA bill.

1361

Final Bill Status
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law, and (2)
Education and the
Workforce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Employer-Employee
Relations.
Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.
Referred to Agriculture
Committee’s Subcommittee
on General Farm
Commodities and Risk
Management.
Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.
Referred to Education and
the Workforce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Employer-Employee
Relations.
Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee’s
Subcommittee on Water and
Power. Hearings held.
Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.
Committee consideration
and mark-up session held.
Reported out favorably as
amended. Placed on Senate
Legislative Calendar under
General Orders.
Referred to Committee on
Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.

1362

UTAH LAW REVIEW

Bill Name
Consumer Fairness Act of
2002, H.R. 5162, 107th
Cong. (2002).

Relevant Purpose of Bill
Same as prior CFA bill.

Arbitration Fairness Act of
2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong.
(2002).

To “amend chapter 1 of title
9, United States Code, to
provide for greater fairness
in the arbitration process.”314
To “amend title 9, United
States Code, to provide for
greater fairness in the
arbitration process relating
to livestock and poultry
contracts.”315
Same as prior FCGA bill.

Fair Contracts for Growers
Act of 2002, S. 2943, 107th
Cong. (2002).

Fair Contracts for Growers
Act of 2003, S. 91, 108th
Cong. (2003).
American Homebuyer’s
Protection Act, H.R. 3414,
108th Cong. (2003).

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Referred to Banking and
Financial Services
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Same as prior AHPA bills.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Housing and Community
Opportunity.

A Bill to Amend Title 9,
United States Code, to
Allow Employees the Right
to Accept or Reject the Use
of Arbitration to Resolve an
Employment Controversy,
H.R. 540, 108th Cong.
(2003).
Consumer Fairness Act of
2003, H.R. 1887, 108th
Cong. (2003).

Same as the prior versions of
the bill.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.

Same as prior CFA bills.

Predatory Mortgage
Lending Practices
Reduction Act, H.R. 1663,

Section 1003 would have
amended the Consumer
Credit Protection Act to

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on

314

This is basically the same bill as the Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of
Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000) and the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th
Cong. (2007).
315
This bill would allow arbitration under livestock and poultry contracts only if the
parties agreed to arbitrate after the dispute arose. It would also require the arbitrator to
issue a written award. See Fair Contracts for Growers Act of 2002, S. 2943, 107th Cong. §
2(b), (c) (2002).
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Bill Name
108th Cong. (2003).

Responsible Lending Act,
H.R. 833, 108th Cong.
(2003).

Predatory Lending
Consumer Protection Act of
2003, S. 1928, 108th Cong.
(2003).
Mutual Fund Investor
Protection Act of 2003, S.
1958, 108th Cong. (2003).

Employee Benefits
Protection Act of 2003,
H.R. 1397, 108th Cong.
(2003).

Relevant Purpose of Bill
prohibit “arbitration clauses
imposed on consumers
without their consent.”
Section 102(e) would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit
“oppressive, unfair, [or]
unconscionable” mandatoryarbitration clauses.316
Same as prior PLCPA bills.

Section 209 would have
allowed investors to have
complaints heard in “an
independent arbitration
forum . . . .” of the investor’s
choice.
Section 6 would have
amended ERISA to prohibit
pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration agreements.

Payday Borrower Protection
Act of 2003, H.R. 2407,
108th Cong. (2003).

Same as prior PBPA bill.

Genetically Engineered
Crop and Animal Farmer
Protection Act of 2003,
H.R. 2918, 108th Cong.
(2003).
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention
Act, H.R. 5340, 108th
Cong. (2004).

Same as prior GECAFPA
bill.

Taxpayer Abuse Prevention

Same as other TAPA bill.

316

Section 4 would have
prevented mandatory
arbitration provisions in loan
agreements linked to
anticipated tax refunds.

1363

Final Bill Status
Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittees on
(a) Housing and Community
Opportunity and (b)
Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.
Referred to Committee on
Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
Referred to Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee.

Referred to Education and
the Workforce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Employer-Employee
Relations.
Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
Referred to Agriculture
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Conservation, Credit,
Rural Development and
Research.
Referred to (1) Ways and
Means Committee, and (2)
Banking and Financial
Services Committee’s
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
Referred to Finance

Section 102 has a safe-harbor provision that exempts arbitration provisions so long
as they meet the listed requirements (e.g., forum in federal judicial district where property
is located).

1364
Bill Name
Act, S. 2947, 108th Cong.
(2004).
Fairness and Individual
Rights Necessary to Ensure
a Stronger Society: Civil
Rights Act of 2004, S.
2088, 108th Cong. (2004).
Fairness and Individual
Rights Necessary to Ensure
a Stronger Society: Civil
Rights Act of 2004, H.R.
3809, 108th Cong. (2004).

UTAH LAW REVIEW
Relevant Purpose of Bill

Final Bill Status
Committee.

Section 513 would have
prohibited arbitration
provisions in employment
contracts.

Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.

Same as other FAIRNESS
bill.

Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Constitution; (2)
Education and Workforce
Committee’s
Subcommittees on (a)
Employer-Employee
Relations, (b) Workforce
Protections, (c) 21st Century
Competitiveness, and (d)
Education Reform; and (3)
Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee’s
Subcommittee on Aviation.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittees on
(a) Housing and Community
Opportunity and (b)
Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored
Enterprises.

Prohibit Predatory Lending
Act, H.R. 3974, 108th
Cong. (2004).

Section 4(d) of the bill
would have amended the
Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit arbitration
provisions in high-cost
mortgage contracts.

Mutual Fund Reform Act of
2004, H.R. 4505, 108th
Cong. (2004).

Section 404 called for a
study and report on the trend
in arbitration clauses and
other “means to avert the
filing of claims in Federal or
State courts” since Dec. 31,
1995.
Same as other MFRA bill.

Mutual Fund Reform Act of
2004, S. 2059, 108th Cong.
(2004).
Save Our Homes Act, H.R.
3322, 108th Cong. (2004).

Taxpayer Abuse Prevention
Act, H.R. 969, 109th Cong.
(2005).

[NO. 4

Same as prior SOHA bill.

Same as prior TAPA bills.

Referred to Committee on
Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittees on
(1) Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit and
(2) Housing and
Community Opportunity.
Referred to (1) Ways and
Means Committee, and (2)
Banking and Financial
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Bill Name

Relevant Purpose of Bill

Taxpayer Abuse Prevention
Act, S. 324, 109th Cong.
(2005).
American Homebuyer’s
Protection Act, H.R. 4037,
109th Cong. (2005).

Same as prior TAPA bills.

A Bill to Amend Title 9,
United States Code, to
Allow Employees the Right
to Accept or Reject the Use
of Arbitration to Resolve an
Employment Controversy,
H.R. 3651, 109th Cong.
(2005).
Fair Contracts for Growers
Act of 2005, S. 2131, 109th
Cong. (2005).
Preservation of Civil Rights
Protections Act of 2005,
H.R. 2969, 109th Cong.
(2005).

Same as the prior versions of
the bill.

Predatory Mortgage
Lending Practices
Reduction Act, H.R. 1994,
109th Cong. (2005).
Borrower’s Bill of Rights
Act, H.R. 1643, 109th
Cong. (2005).

Same as prior PMLPRA bill.

Prohibit Predatory Lending
Act, H.R. 1182, 109th
Cong. (2005).

Section 7 would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit
arbitration provisions in a
“consumer credit transaction
that is secured by the
consumer’s principal

Same as prior AHPA bills.

1365

Final Bill Status
Services Committee’s
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
Referred to Finance
Committee.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Housing and Community
Opportunity.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.

Same as prior FCGA bills.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Same as prior PCRPA bills.

Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Constitution, and (2)
Education and the
Workforce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Employer-Employee
Relations.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.

Section 27(b) would have
prohibited pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration
agreements in consumer
lending agreements.

Referred to (1) Committee
on Banking and Financial
Services, and (2) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittees on
(1) Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit and
(2) Housing and
Community Opportunity.

1366
Bill Name
Employee Benefits
Protection Act of 2005,
H.R. 1058, 109th Cong.
(2005).

UTAH LAW REVIEW
Relevant Purpose of Bill
dwelling . . . .”
Same as prior EBPA bill.

Payday Borrower Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. 1660,
109th Cong. (2005).

Same as prior PBPA bills.

Fair and Responsible
Lending Act, H.R. 4471,
109th Cong. (2005).

Section 104 would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit predispute mandatory
arbitration agreements.
Section 101 would have
created a new section 202(b)
in the Agricultural Fair
Practices Act of 1967 to
make pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses in
livestock and poultry
contracts unenforceable.
Same as prior GECAFPA
bill.

Competitive and Fair
Agricultural Markets Act of
2006, S. 2307, 109th Cong.
(2006).

Genetically Engineered
Crop and Animal Farmer
Protection Act, H.R. 5266,
109th Cong. (2006).
John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R.
5122, 109th Cong. (2006).

Taxpayer Abuse Prevention
Act, S. 1133, 110th Cong.
(2007).
Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong.
(2007).

317

Section 670 made predispute arbitration
agreements unenforceable
against military members
and their dependents in
consumer credit disputes.317
Same as other TAPA bills.

The AFA’s broad, stated
goal was to “amend chapter
1 of title 9 of United States

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Referred to Education and
the Workforce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Employer-Employee
Relations.
Referred to the Committee
on Financial Services’
Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer
Credit.
Referred to the Committee
on Banking and Financial
Services.

Referred to Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee.

Referred to Agriculture
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Conservation, Credit,
Rural Development and
Research.
Passed in both House and
Senate. Signed by President
Bush.

Referred to Finance
Committee.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on the Constitution.

See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 10
U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006).
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Bill Name

Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007, H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007).

Fair Arbitration Act of
2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong.
(2007).

Consumer Fairness Act of
2007, H.R. 1443, 110th
Cong. (2007).
Predatory Mortgage
Lending Practices
Reduction Act, H.R. 2061,
110th Cong. (2007).
American Homebuyer’s
Protection Act, H.R. 1519,
110th Cong. (2007).

Relevant Purpose of Bill
Code with respect to
arbitration.”318
Same as other AFA bill.

To “amend chapter 1 of title
9, United States Code, to
establish fair procedures for
arbitration clauses in
contracts.”319
Same as prior CFA bills.

Same as prior PMLPRA
bills.

Same as prior AHPA bills.

Fair Contracts for Growers
Act of 2007, S. 221, 110th
Cong. (2007).

Same as prior FCGA bill.

Reservists Access to Justice
Act of 2007, H.R. 3393,
110th Cong. (2007).

Section 3 would have
amended Chapter 43 of Title
38 of the U.S. Code to make
Chapter 1 of Title 9
inapplicable to employment
and reemployment claims

318

1367

Final Bill Status
Hearings held.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Hearings held.
Subcommittee consideration
and mark-up. Subcommittee
then forwarded it to full
Committee by voice vote.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.
Referred to (1) Committee
on Banking and Financial
Services, and (2) Energy
and Commerce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee. Reported out of
Committee and placed on
Senate calendar under
General Orders.
Referred to Veterans’
Affairs Committee’s
Subcommittee on Economic
Opportunity. Hearings held.

More specifically, it prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements for employment
disputes, consumer disputes, franchise disputes, disputes under statutes that protect civil
rights, and disputes under contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power.
319
This is basically the same bill as the Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of
Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000) and the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026,
107th Cong. (2002).

1368
Bill Name
Helping Families Save
Their Homes in Bankruptcy
Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th
Cong. (2007).

Competitive and Fair
Agricultural Markets Act of
2007, S. 622, 110th Cong.
(2007).
Competitive and Fair
Agricultural Markets Act of
2007, H.R. 2135, 110th
Cong. (2007).
Private Sector
Whistleblower Protection
Streamlining Act of 2007,
H.R. 4047, 110th Cong.
(2007).
Home Ownership
Preservation and Protection
of 2007, S. 2452, 110th
Cong. (2007).

Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act of
2007, H.R. 3915, 110th
Cong. (2007).

UTAH LAW REVIEW
Relevant Purpose of Bill
under Chapter 43.
Section 203 would have
amended Section 1328 of
Title 28 of the U.S. Code to
say: “Notwithstanding any
agreement for arbitration
that is subject to chapter 1 of
title 9, in any core
proceeding under section
157(b) . . . the court may
hear and determine the
proceeding, and enter
appropriate orders and
judgments, in lieu of referral
to arbitration.”
Same as prior CFAMA bill.

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Referred to Judiciary
Committee. Hearings held.
Reported out of Committee
and placed on Senate
calendar under General
Orders.

Referred to Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee.

Same as prior CFAMA bills.

Referred to Agriculture
Committee.

Section 104(b) would have
made pre-dispute arbitration
provisions that applied to
claims between a
whistleblower and his or her
employer unenforceable.
Section 706 would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit
provisions in home
mortgage loans that “bar a
consumer from access to any
judicial procedure, forum, or
remedy through any court
. . . .”
Section 206 would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to prohibit
mandatory arbitration
provisions in home
mortgage loans, with the
exception of reverse
mortgages, or extensions of
credit secured by a
consumer’s principal

Referred to Education and
Workforce Committee’s
Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections.

Referred to Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services. Reported out of
Committee. Passed House.
Referred to Senate
Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.

2011]

REGULATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION

Bill Name
Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008, H.R.
2419, 110th Cong. (2007).

Credit Card Safety Star Act
of 2007, S. 2411, 110th
Cong. (2007).

Credit Card Safety Star Act
of 2008, H.R. 6978, 110th
Cong. (2008).
Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act of 2008,
H.R. 6126, 110th Cong.
(2008).

Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act, S. 2838,
110th Cong. (2008).

320

Relevant Purpose of Bill
dwelling.
Section 11005 amends Sec.
201 of the Packers and
Stockyards Act of 1921 to
require poultry and livestock
contracts to contain
provisions allowing growers
and producers to opt out of
arbitration. It also required
the governing agency to
establish regulations that
would allow contracting
parties to fully participate in
the arbitration process.
Section 3 would have
amended the Truth in
Lending Act to create a
point rating system for credit
cards; the system awarded
one point for agreements
with no mandatory
arbitration and that took
away one point for
agreements with mandatory
arbitration.
Same as other CCSSA bill.

Section 2 would have
prohibited pre-dispute
arbitration agreements
between long-term care
facilities and residents.

Same as other FNHAA bill.

1369

Final Bill Status
Passed House and Senate.
Veto overridden.320

Referred to Committee on
Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Hearings held.
Subcommittee consideration
and mark-up session held.
Forwarded to full
committee. Committee
consideration and mark-up
held. Reported to the full
House. Placed on the Union
Calendar.
Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee, and (2) Aging
Committee. Joint hearings
held in the Aging
Committee and the

See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2006).
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Bill Name

Relevant Purpose of Bill

Automobile Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2008, H.R.
5312, 110th Cong. (2008).

Section 2 would have
prohibited pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration
provisions in “motor vehicle
consumer lease or sales
contracts” and required any
arbitration awards to
“include a brief, informal
discussion of the factual and
legal basis for the award
. . . .”
Section 2 would have
prohibited pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration
provisions in “alcoholic
beverage franchise
contracts,” required postdispute arbitrators to follow
the applicable law, and
required written
explanations for arbitration
awards.

Alcohol Franchise Contract
Arbitration Fairness Act of
2008, H.R. 7076, 110th
Cong. (2008).

Servicemembers Access to
Justice Act of 2008, S.
3432, 110th Cong. (2008).

Servicemembers Access to
Justice Act of 2008, H.R.
7178, 110th Cong. (2008).
Civil Rights Act of 2008, S.
2554, 110th Cong. (2008).

Section 3 would have
amended the Uniformed
Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act
of 1994 to make mandatory
arbitration provisions in
employment contracts
unenforceable, although
section 3 includes
exceptions.
Same as other SAJA bill.

Same as prior FAIRNESS
bills.

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights. Reported
to the full Senate by the
Judiciary Committee.
Placed on Senate
Legislative Calendar under
General Orders.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Hearings held.
Consideration and mark-up
held. Bill forwarded to full
Committee.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to Veterans’
Affairs Committee.

Referred to (1) Veteran
Affairs Committee, and (2)
Judiciary Committee.
Referred to Committee on
Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions.
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Bill Name
Civil Rights Act of 2008,
H.R. 5129, 110th Cong.
(2008).

Relevant Purpose of Bill
Same as prior FAIRNESS
bills.

Foreclosure Prevention and
Sound Mortgage Servicing
Act of 2008, H.R. 5679,
110th Cong. (2008).

Section 2 would have
amended the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974 to prohibit any
mortgagee of a “covered
federally related mortgage
loan” from requiring a
borrower to agree to
arbitration as a condition of
receiving loan modification
services.
Section 423 would have
amended Section 1334 of
Title 28 of the U.S. Code to
say: “Notwithstanding any
agreement for arbitration
that is subject to chapter 1 of
title 9, in any core
proceeding under section
157(b) . . . the court may
hear and determine the
proceeding, and enter
appropriate orders and
judgments, in lieu of referral
to arbitration.”321
Section 104(b)(5) would
have prohibited mandatory
arbitration between biotech
companies and purchasers of
genetically engineered
plants, animals, or seeds.322

Foreclosure Prevention Act
of 2008, S. 2636, 110th
Cong. (2008).

Genetically Engineered
Technology Farmer
Protection Act, H.R. 6637,
110th Cong. (2008).

321

1371

Final Bill Status
Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Constitution, Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties,
(2) Education and Labor
Committee, and (3)
Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee’s
Subcommittee on Aviation.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services’ Subcommittee on
Housing and Community
Opportunity. Hearings held.

Introduced in Senate. Placed
on calendar under General
Orders.

Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee, (2) Energy and
Commerce Committee’s
Subcommittee on Health,
and (3) Agriculture
Committee’s
Subcommittees on (a)
Livestock, Dairy, and

This is the same as the provision found in the Helping Families Save Their Homes
in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007).
322
This is the same as the provision in the prior versions of the Genetically
Engineered Crop and Animal Farm Protection Act. See, e.g., Genetically Engineered Crop
and Animal Farmer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4812, 107th Cong. (2002).
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Bill Name

Relevant Purpose of Bill

Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, S. 931, 111th Cong.
(2009).

The AFA’s broad, stated
goal is the same as the AFA
bill from 2007. But the
substance of the two bills is
somewhat different. This
one, for example, drops
“disputes under statutes
regulating contracts between
parties of unequal
bargaining power” from its
coverage.
Same as other 2009 AFA
bill.

Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, H.R. 1020, 111th
Cong. (2009).

Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act of 2009,
H.R. 1237, 111th Cong.
(2009).

Same as prior FNHAA bills.

Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act, S. 512,
111th Cong. (2009).
Consumer Fairness Act of
2009, H.R. 991, 111th
Cong. (2009).
Predatory Mortgage
Lending Practices
Reduction Act, H.R. 2108,
111th Cong. (2009).
Rape Victims Act of 2009,
S. 2915, 111th Cong.
(2009).

Same as prior FNHAA bills,
except in section 3.

Non-Federal Employee
Whistleblower Protection
Act of 2009, S. 1745, 111th
Cong. (2009).

Same as prior CFA bills.

Same as prior PMLPRA
bills.

Section 3 would make
arbitration provisions in
employment contracts
unenforceable with respect
to “any claim relating to a
tort arising out of a rape.”
Section 2 would amend the
Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act
of 1949 to make pre-dispute
arbitration clauses
unenforceable for disputes

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status
Poultry, (b) Horticulture and
Organic Agriculture, and (c)
Specialty Crops, Rural
Development, and Foreign
Agriculture.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee.

Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Subcommittee discharged.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commercial and
Administrative Law.
Subcommittee discharged.
Referred to Judiciary
Committee.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.
Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.
Referred to Health,
Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.

Referred to Committee on
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.
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Bill Name

Payday Loan Reform Act of
2009, H.R. 1214, 111th
Cong. (2009).

Payday Lending Reform
Act of 2009, H.R. 2563,
111th Cong. (2009).

Servicemembers Access to
Justice Act of 2009, S. 263,
111th Cong. (2009).
Servicemembers Access to
Justice Act of 2009, H.R.
1474, 111th Cong. (2009).

Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2009,
H.R. 1507, 111th Cong.
(2009).

Credit Card Safety Star Act
of 2009, S. 900, 111th
Cong. (2009).
Foreclosure Prevention and

Relevant Purpose of Bill
arising under the Act, with
the exception of arbitration
and collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 2 would amend the
Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit payday lenders from
including mandatory
arbitration provisions that
are “oppressive, unfair,
unconscionable, or
substantially in derogation
of the rights of the
consumer.”
Section 2 would amend the
Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit payday lenders from
including mandatory
arbitration provisions that
are “oppressive, unfair,
unconscionable, or
substantially in derogation
of the rights of the
consumer.”
Same as prior 2008 SAJA
bills.
Same as prior 2008 SAJA
bills.

Section 11 would amend
Section 315 of the Federal
Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949 to
make pre-dispute arbitration
clauses unenforceable for
disputes arising under the
Act.
Same as prior CCSSA bills.

Same as prior FPSMSA bill.
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Final Bill Status

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services.

Referred to Veterans’
Affairs Committee.
Hearings held.
Referred to (1) Veterans’
Affairs Committee’s
Subcommittee on Economic
Opportunity, (2) Armed
Services Committee’s
Subcommittee on Military
Personnel, and (3) Oversight
and Government Reform
Committee.
Referred to (1) Oversight
and Government Reform
Committee, and (2)
Homeland Security
Committee. Hearings held
in Oversight and
Government Reform.
Referred to Committee on
Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
Referred to Committee on

1374
Bill Name
Sound Mortgage Servicing
Act of 2009, H.R. 3451,
111th Cong. (2009).
Investor Protection Act of
2009, H.R. 3817, 111th
Cong. (2009).

Mortgage Reform and AntiPredatory Lending Act,
H.R. 1728, 111th Cong.
(2009).

Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 2010,
H.R. 3326, 111th Cong.
(2009).

Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act of
2009, H.R. 3126, 111th
Cong. (2009).

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Relevant Purpose of Bill

Final Bill Status
Banking and Financial
Services.

Section 201 would amend
the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to give
the SEC the authority to
prohibit or regulate predispute mandatory
arbitration provisions
applying to disputes arising
under either Act.
Relevant provision similar to
prior MRAPLA bill.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services. Reported out of
Committee.

Section 8116 of the bill
prohibits the government
from contracting with
employers that require
arbitration of “any claim
under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 or any
tort related to or arising out
of sexual assault or
harassment, including
assault and battery,
intentional infliction of
emotional distress, false
imprisonment, or negligent
hiring, supervision, or
retention.”
Section 125 would give the
proposed agency the power
to prohibit or regulate
mandatory arbitration
provisions between “covered
persons” and consumers.

Referred to Committee on
Banking and Financial
Services. Reported out of
Committee. Passed House
and referred to Senate
Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Passed in both House and
Senate. Signed by President
Obama.

(1) Referred to Committee
on Banking and Financial
Services. Reported to full
House. (2) Referred to
Energy and Commerce
Committee’s Subcommittee
on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection.
Hearings held by the
Subcommittee.
Subcommittee discharged.
Consideration and mark-up
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Bill Name

Relevant Purpose of Bill

Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009,
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
(2010).323

Sections 10208 and 7201
function similarly to the
relevant provisions of the
Investor Protection Act of
2009 and the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency
Act of 2009.
Same as the Wall Street
Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.

Restoring American
Financial Stability Act of
2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
(2010).
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Final Bill Status
by full Committee. Reported
to full House.
Passed both the House and
the Senate. Signed by
President Obama.

Referred to Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs
Committee. Reported to full
Senate. Placed on Calendar
under General Orders.
Considered in Full Senate.
Incorporated into H.R. 4173
(see above entry). Returned
to Calendar.
Referred to (1) Judiciary
Committee, (2) Agriculture
Committee, and (3) Energy
and Commerce Committee.

Genetically Engineered
Technology Farmer
Protection Act, H.R. 5579,
111th Cong. (2010).

Same as prior GETFPA bill.

Robert C. Bird Miner
Safety and Health Act of
2010, H.R. 5663, 111th
Cong. (2010).

Section 401 would amend
section 105(c) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 to include a
provision eliminating
contracting parties’ ability to
limit the rights and remedies
of employees through predispute arbitration. Section
701 would make a similar
change to Section 11 of the
Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.
Same as prior MSHA bill.

Referred to (1) Committee
on Education and Labor.
Hearings held.
Consideration and mark-up
held. Reported out to full
House. Referred to (2)
Judiciary Committee.
Judiciary Committee
discharged. Placed on Union
Calendar.

Section 401 would amend
section 105(c) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 to include a

Referred to Committee on
Education and Labor’s
Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections.

Robert C. Byrd Mine and
Workplace Safety and
Health Act of 2010, S.
3671, 111th Cong. (2010).
Mine Safety Accountability
and Improved Protection
Act, H.R. 5788, 111th
Cong. (2010).
323

Referred to Committee on
Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions.

This is also known as the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010,
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010).
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Bill Name

Mine Safety Protection Act
of 2010, H.R. 6495, 111th
Cong. (2010).

Taxpayer Abuse Prevention
Act, H.R. 5693, 111th
Cong. (2010).
Taxpayer Abuse Prevention
Act, S. 585, 111th Cong.
(2009).
Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 2011,
S. 3800, 111th Cong.
(2010).

UTAH LAW REVIEW
Relevant Purpose of Bill
provision eliminating
contracting parties’ ability to
limit the rights and remedies
of employees through predispute arbitration.
Section 401 would amend
section 105(c) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 to include a
provision eliminating
contracting parties’ ability to
limit the rights and remedies
of employees through predispute arbitration.
Same as other 2004 TAPA
bills.

[NO. 4
Final Bill Status

Failed on motion to suspend
rules and pass the bill by
vote of 214-193.

Same as other 2004 TAPA
bills.

Referred to (1) Ways and
Means Committee, and (2)
Financial Services
Committee.
Referred to Finance
Committee.

Section 8101 is the same as
Section 8116 of the DDAA
of 2010.

Placed on Senate
Legislative Calendar under
General Orders.

